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We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently
became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are
timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies
from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership
reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider
ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases
profits from timing OMRs.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V.
JEL classification:
G3
G35
Keywords:
Open market repurchase
Timing
Ownership
Liquidity
1. Introduction
In this study, we investigate the timing of open market repurchase (OMR) transactions. We use novel data from SEC quarterly
filings on the repurchase transactions of U.S. listed companies. The data recently became available following changes in
mandatory disclosure in 2004. Past research suggests that companies seek to repurchase stock at low prices.1 Companies can time
repurchases to buy back stock at favorable priceswhen corporate decisionmakers have better information than outside shareholders.
Repurchases can redistribute wealth among existing shareholders depending on shareholders' decisions to sell or retain their shares.
Becausewealth is transferred from selling to non-selling shareholders, repurchases that are timed using private information resemble
insider trading.2
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1 According to Brav et al. (2005), U.S. executives often state that the market price of their stock is an important or a very important factor inﬂuencing their
repurchase decisions and that “their ﬁrm tracks repurchase timing”. The belief that companies attempt to repurchase stock when it is cheap is so widespread that
the SEC has encouraged companies to announce repurchases during times of crisis to reassure the market (SEC, 2001).
2 Rule 10b-5 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires insiders to refrain from trading in the ﬁrm's shares while in possession of “material” non-
public information regarding share value. This prohibition theoretically applies to share repurchases (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19244, November 17,
1982, 47 FR 53333, 53334, November 26, 1982). However, the bar for materiality is high, repurchase programs are widespread, and we are not aware of any case
in which repurchases under a board-approved repurchase program have led to regulatory sanctions for insider trading. In fact, the SEC actively encourages stock
repurchases by providing safe harbors to anti-manipulation rules through Rule 10b-18.
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In the first part of this article, we analyze whether repurchasing companies time repurchases by executing OMRs at relatively
low prices. Previous research on the timing of repurchase transactions by U.S. listed companies is limited given the historical lack
of reliable data. Before 2004, U.S. companies were not required to disclose detailed price and volume data on repurchase
transactions. Hence, most previous studies use data on the announcements of repurchase programs rather than data on completed
repurchase transactions. Effective 17 December 2003, the SEC requires U.S. listed companies to report monthly volume and price
data on their repurchase activity in their quarterly filings (10-Ks and 10-Qs).3 We take advantage of this recent regulatory change
and hand-collect unique data on the monthly OMR activity from quarterly filings of a sample of U.S. companies listed on the NYSE,
NASDAQ or AMEX over the period between February 2004 and July 2006. Specifically, we collect monthly data on the volume of
OMR transactions for 265 U.S. companies and 5035 firm-months, and monthly OMR price data for 214 companies and 4066 firm-
months.
We use these data to test whether companies time OMRs by repurchasing stock at comparatively low prices. We find that
stock repurchases follow abnormal price declines and precede abnormal price increases. Moreover, average repurchase prices are
lower than comparable average market prices, and the total cost of a company's repurchases is lower than a benchmark based on
naïve trading strategies. Our findings suggest that companies achieve economically significant cost savings by timing OMRs.
Estimated average cost savings over a trading period of 19 months amount to around 0.25% of the market capitalization of a
company's equity, and 0.54% of the book value of a company's total assets. The maximum values of the 19-month cost savings are
staggering at 7.76% ofmarket capitalization and 28.21%of total assets.We show thatmost of these cost savings derive fromcompanies
selecting the most favorable months in which to make repurchases. Based on this evidence and after considering alternative
explanations (such as price support and signaling), we conclude that companies time repurchases on the open market.
Next, we examine the determinants of repurchase timing. We argue that insider and institutional ownership are crucial
determinants of the profits realized by companies that time OMRs (through price advantages and cost savings). A company should
have fewer opportunities to time repurchases when a higher proportion of its outstanding shares are held by informed investors.
More informed ownership is likely to result in more informed trading that renders the stock price more informative, offering less
scope for temporary undervaluation. Both insiders and institutions are normally considered well-informed investors (e.g., Seyhun,
1986; Sias et al., 2006). In sum, we expect an “information effect” of both insider and institutional ownership; either type of
ownership may have a negative impact on the price advantages and cost savings realized by repurchasing companies.
For insider ownership, we may also expect an opposite effect. Fried (2005) highlights the wealth transfers from selling to non-
selling shareholders through repurchases of undervalued shares. He argues that by repurchasing shares at less than fair value,
informed insiders (who are unlikely to sell at such prices) extract wealth from selling shareholders (who tend to be less informed).
Fried argues that non-selling shareholders benefit from thiswealth transfer pro rata in relation to their pre-repurchase shareholdings.
The higher the insiders' shareholdings themore they stand to benefit and the greater their incentive to time repurchases. This “wealth
transfer effect” predicts a positive relation between profits from repurchase timing and insider ownership.
It is reasonable to expect that both effects, the wealth transfer and the information effect, exist at the same time but the
relative strengths of the two effects may vary with ownership levels. It is possible that the relation between insider ownership
and repurchase timing is non-linear. For instance, at low levels of informed ownership the positive wealth transfer effect of inside
information may offset its negative information effect; while the information effect may prevail at high levels of inside information.
We have no ex ante expectations regarding the relative strengths of the two effects over various ranges of inside ownership; instead
we expect our empirical analysis to shed light on the matter.
We also expect a positive relation between market liquidity and companies' opportunity to time repurchases. In less liquid
markets, transactions have larger price impacts and are subject to higher transaction costs (i.e. wider bid–ask spreads). As higher
price impact and transaction costs increase the price at which stock can be bought back, less liquid stocks will provide less
opportunity for cost savings from OMR timing than more liquid stocks.
We estimate the impact of ownership structure (insider and institutional ownership) and market liquidity (Amihud illiquidity
ratio (Amihud, 2002) and bid–ask spread) on several novel “timing measures” designed to capture the price and cost advantages
from OMR timing. These timing measures are computed as differences between the actual repurchase price or cost and several
benchmarks based on market price and volume data. We find results that support our expectations. We report an inverse u-shaped
relation between repurchase timing and insider ownership: at low levels of insider ownership there is a positive association between
insider ownership and our timing measures, while at high levels there is a negative association. This suggests that at low levels of
insider ownership, the wealth transfer effect dominates the information effect and insider ownership encourages timing, while at
high levels the negative information effect offsets the positive wealth-transfer effect as more informed ownership and trading
provides companies less opportunity to time repurchases. We also find evidence for an information effect of institutional ownership:
we document a monotonic, negative relation between our timingmeasures and institutional ownership. Finally, we find that greater
stock liquidity (measured by a lower Amihud illiquidity ratio or a lower bid–ask spread) facilitates repurchase timing supporting our
prediction that companies benefit more from timing OMRs when their stock is more liquid.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The existing literature on the timing of repurchases is limited,
and the literature on repurchase transactions (as opposed to announcements of repurchase programs) is scarce in the U.S.A. due
to the lack of disclosure of detailed repurchase-transaction data. Prior to 2004, U.S. researchers had to rely on either Compustat-
based or CRSP-based repurchase measures. These measures are known to be biased (e.g., Banyi et al., 2008) and they cannot be
3 Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by Issuers and Others (Exchange Act Release No. 33‐8335); available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ﬁnal/33-8335.htm.
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used to precisely obtain repurchase prices.4 Thanks to disclosure changes introduced in December 2003, we are able to construct
a novel dataset of monthly repurchase volume and price data. Based on these data, we investigate if companies time repurchases
and evaluate the economic significance of the benefits accruing to companies from timing their repurchases. To the best of our
knowledge, Bozanic (2010) is the only published paper that uses the recently available actual monthly repurchase data to
investigate repurchase timing.5 However, there are important differences between Bozanic's article and our paper. Bozanic
(2010) tests the market timing hypothesis by studying the relations between repurchase volume and both lagged stock returns
and the differences between leading stock prices and current repurchase prices. We not only run similar tests using lagged and
leading market-adjusted returns as explanatory variables but we also investigate whether, after controlling for standard risk
factors, dummies based on the timing of repurchase transactions are significant determinants of stock returns. Further, Bozanic
(2010) does not study the total cost of a company's repurchases whereas we provide direct evidence that companies make OMRs
at comparatively low prices.6 In this paper we also investigate the determinants of repurchase timing. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no published papers on U.S. repurchases that pursue a similar line of investigation. Moreover, the relations
between repurchase timing and both ownership structure and liquidity that we report in this paper are completely novel. Finally,
we hope our paper, in particular the parts on the technical aspects of the data collection process in Section 2, will represent a point
of reference for the growing number of researchers using the repurchase-transaction data that are now available.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data with particular focus on the data on repurchase transactions.
Section 3 motivates our examination of repurchase transactions, and presents empirical evidence consistent with repurchase
timing. In Section 4, we examine the determinants of repurchase timing focusing on ownership structure and stock liquidity.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our findings.
2. U.S. disclosure environment and data
2.1. Disclosure of monthly repurchase volume data and monthly repurchase price data
On 17 December 2003, a new SEC disclosure requirement took effect.7 Under the new rule, companies must include a table in
their quarterly filings (10-Ks and 10-Qs) providing, for the quarter, the following information on a monthly basis: total number of
shares repurchased (monthly repurchase volume), the average price paid per share (monthly repurchase price), the total number
of shares repurchased as part of publicly announced repurchase programs, and the maximum number (or approximate dollar value)
of shares that may still be purchased under existing repurchase programs. Moreover, in the footnotes to the table companies must
provide information on repurchase programs that expire or are suspended over the period the table refers to. Finally, if there are
repurchases that are not carried out as part of publicly announced repurchase programs, additional footnotes should be included
disclosing the amount of shares repurchased outside publicly announced programs and the nature of the repurchase transactions. For
example, the footnotes should specify the number of shares that are repurchased on the open market, through privately negotiated
transactions (PNTs), or through self-tender offers (fixed-price or Dutch-auction self-tender offers).
We hand-collect data on OMRs from SEC filings 10-Ks and 10-Qs, which are freely available from Edgar. Specifically, we collect
monthly volume and price data on OMRs carried out by a sample of U.S. listed companies in the period between February 2004
and July 2006. Data are gathered from quarterly SEC filings (10-Ks and 10-Qs). We construct two datasets: one with monthly
repurchase volume data and a smaller one with monthly repurchase price data. These datasets are described in the following two
sections.
2.2. Repurchase volume dataset
We first identify U.S. listed companies that potentially executed OMRs of their common stock in the sample period ranging from
January 2004 to December 2004. We use the SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions to search for announcements of
OMR programs of U.S. listed companies (listed on NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX) in the period between 1 January 2004 and 31 December
2004. We find 442 companies with announced repurchase programs.
We study the timingof repurchases by focusing on companies that (i) have the right to purchase own stock throughout the sample
period and (ii) do repurchase in the sample period.We analyze a company's repurchase timing in the 19 months following themonth
of the announcement of the company's repurchase program (post-announcement period).8
4 Compustat-based measures are the change in treasury stock, the decrease in shares outstanding, and the cash spent to repurchase common stock. The only
CRSP-based measure is the decrease in shares outstanding. Please, refer to Banyi et al. (2008) for information on the biases that undermine these measures.
5 To the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical study to use monthly repurchase data from SEC ﬁlings is Simkovic (2009), a law and economics article.
Simkovic analyzes the impact of the new repurchase disclosure regime introduced at the end of 2003 on the completion rates of repurchase programs. The
repurchase dataset used by Simkovic is similar to the dataset we use. Banyi et al. (2008) and Bozanic (2010) are the only other two published papers that use
monthly data from SEC ﬁlings.
6 A further difference between Bozanic (2010) and our paper is that we identify and exclude repurchase transactions not executed on the open market using
accurate information from SEC ﬁlings. In contrast, Bozanic (2010) attempts to eliminate these transactions by simply discarding repurchases of 100 or less shares,
and for under a $1 or over $1000.
7 Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33‐8335, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ﬁnal/33-8335.htm.
8 In several cases, we use the terms “ﬁrm-month”, “monthly period”, “calendar month”, and similar terms even when we refer to periods that do not exactly
correspond to calendar months. For example, a company's reporting period stretching from March 28, 2004 to April 28, 2004 is referred to as the calendar month
April 2004.
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For each of the 442 companies that announced repurchase programs, we collect monthly volume (total number of shares
repurchased) data for the overall OMR activity in the 19-month post-announcement period from 10-Ks and 10-Qs.9 We purge the
monthly repurchase volume data by eliminating repurchase transactions that are not carried out on the openmarket. In particular, we
eliminate repurchases executed through self-tender offers, off-market privately negotiated transactions (PNTs), accelerated share
repurchases (ASR), and structured share repurchases (SSR).10 Most of the PNTs are repurchases from directors and employees to
cover tax withholding obligations on exercises of stock options and vesting of restricted shares.11 We take particular care to identify
the volume of non-OMRs searching through 10-Ks and 10-Qs. The new SEC rule on repurchase disclosure requires companies to
specify in their filings the nature of repurchases that are not carried out under publicly announced repurchase programs.
The rule does not explicitly require companies to disclose the nature of the repurchase transactions that are part of publicly
announced programs. While we cannot rule out that some transactions we classify as OMRs are, in reality, other types of stock
repurchase, we are confident that the vast majority of the transactions included in our dataset are OMRs for the following reasons.
First, Regulation FD, introduced by the SEC on 23 October 2000,12 requires companies to disclose material non-public information
to investors when the information has already been disclosed to a selected group of investors. By not disclosing the terms of
executed ASRs, SSRs, and PNTs, companieswould violate this rule given that these terms are arguablymaterial (e.g., the price atwhich
the company is willing to repurchase its own stock conveys information to the market) and are known to the counterparties in the
repurchase transactions. Second, it is very unlikely that the exact nature of large repurchase transactions is not disclosed in quarterly
filings that are designed to inform investors. Self-tender offers, ASRs, and SSRs are normally very large and, for this reason, we are
quite confident that information on these repurchase programs is normally provided in 10-Ks and 10-Qs. Likewise, it is likely that
large PNTs are disclosed.
In collecting repurchase volume data, we exclude observations from the initial dataset of 442 companies for the following
reasons. We exclude 60 companies because their filings cannot be found and/or do not provide sufficiently detailed information
on OMRs. We exclude 6 companies with 13 sub-periods in their fiscal years instead of the standard 12 monthly periods. We also
exclude 25 observations without any OMRs in the post-announcement period, and 82 companies whose repurchase authorization
expires or whose repurchase activity is completed, discontinued, or suspended during the post-announcement period. Finally, we
exclude 3 companies because the information presented in their 10-Ks and 10-Qs does not allow us to purge data from non-OMR
transactions. The final dataset of “clean” monthly volume data includes 265 companies and 5035 firm-months.
2.3. Repurchase price dataset
For each of the 265 companies with “clean” repurchase volume data, we collect monthly price (average price paid to
repurchase shares) data for the 19-month post-announcement period from 10-Ks and 10-Qs. We exclude all the companies for
which we cannot purge price data and eliminate the contaminating effects of non-OMRs owing to the lack of information in
quarterly filings.13 As a result, we exclude a total of 51 companies. The final sample with “clean” monthly repurchase price data
comprises 214 companies and 4066 firm-months.
2.4. Other data
We hand-collect data on insider ownership from companies' proxy statements. These statements report a figure for the
fraction of a company's outstanding shares owned by all of its officers and directors that comprise “contingent shares”. These are
company's shares that officers and directors can acquire within 60 days of the proxy statement date through the exercise of stock
options, warrants, and other similar rights. We take great care in identifying the number of contingent shares searching through
the footnotes to the tables in the proxy statements. We subtract contingent shares from the reported figures on the aggregate
ownership stake of officers and directors. As a result, the insider ownership data used in this study includes only shares that
insiders actually own as of the date of the proxy, not shares that they have the right to purchase in the near future.14 We collect
institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial 13F institutional database. This database contains information from 13F
9 “Overall OMR activity” includes both OMRs that are part of the announced repurchase programs that we ﬁnd on SDC Platinum, and OMRs related to other
programs and/or executed outside publicly announced programs.
10 We exclude ASR and SSR transactions as the company delegates the timing of open market transactions to the investment bank. In an ASR contract, the
repurchasing company purchases own shares from an investment bank. The investment bank sells the shares short to the company and subsequently closes its
short position through open market purchases. In a SSR contract, the company enters into an agreement with the investment bank which requires the company to
make upfront cash payment in exchange for the right to receive its own shares or cash at the time of expiry.
11 Directors and employees may be liable to pay taxes when they exercise stock options on their companies' stock. Also, they may be required to pay taxes when
their restricted shares vest. In both cases, taxes are paid on their behalf by their companies to the taxation authorities. In return for these payments, the
companies may receive shares of their own stock from their directors and employees.
12 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33‐7881, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ﬁnal/33-7881.htm.
13 Lack of information in the ﬁlings makes it generally harder to clean repurchase price data than repurchase volume data. Non-OMRs are very often executed
outside publicly announced programs. Following the introduction of the new SEC disclosure rule in December 2003, companies are obliged to disclose the exact
nature of repurchases that are not part of publicly announced programs in the footnotes to the “repurchase table” in 10-Ks and 10-Qs. For repurchases made
outside publicly announced programs, companies must disclose repurchase volume data but are not required to provide price data.
14 We exclude contingent shares because they may or may not be purchased in the near future and, therefore are a less reliable measure of ownership than
shares that are currently owned. In any case, the empirical ﬁndings are qualitatively similar if we include contingent shares when constructing the insider
ownership measure.
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filings and, therefore, does not report equity holdings of institutions that are not required to file 13F forms. We download daily
data on stock return, stock price, ask and bid prices, trading volume, number of shares outstanding, return on the S&P's Composite
Index, return on the value-weightedmarket index (comprising NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX companies), and return on the equally-
weighted market index (comprising NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX companies) from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). We use CRSP also to collect information on the market where a company is listed and on the company's SIC code. From
the same database, we collect daily data on Fama and French's (1993) three factors and Carhart's (1997) momentum factor. In
some empirical analyses, we use repurchase price and volume data from 10-Ks and 10-Qs that are adjusted for stock splits,
reverse splits, stock dividends, spin-offs, and similar events. To carry out the adjustments, we retrieve the information needed
from 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and CRSP. Similarly, wherever necessary, we use daily price and trading volume data from CRSP that are
adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends, and similar transactions. Finally, we collect data on companies' total assets, total
liabilities, cash and short term investments, and operating income from Compustat.
2.5. Descriptive statistics for the repurchase volume dataset
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for the larger repurchase dataset with “clean” volume data. As reported in
Panel A of Table 1, our dataset comprises 265 companies and 5035 monthly observations. 2939 of these monthly observations are
repurchase firm-months, i.e. firm-months in which the volume of repurchased shares is larger than zero. The remaining 2096
observations are non-repurchase firm-months.
Table 1
Firm-months with repurchases, firm-months without repurchases, and monthly number of repurchases over the number of outstanding shares (REP).
Panel A: total number of ﬁrm-months with repurchases and ﬁrm-months without repurchases
Variable Observations Observations over total number of ﬁrm-months (5035 ﬁrm-months)
Firm-months with repurchases 2939 0.58
Firm-months without repurchases 2096 0.42
Panel B: the relative frequencies for ﬁrm-months with and without repurchases across calendar months
Variable Calendar
months
Average
frequency
Median
frequency
Standard
deviation
Maximum
frequency
Minimum
frequency
p-Value
Kolmogorov–Smirnov
Relative frequency firm-months
with repurchases
30 3.33% 3.61% 1.74% 6.23% 0.31% 0.006
Relative frequency firm-months
without repurchases
30 3.33% 3.98% 2.03% 6.63% 0.05% –
Panel C: the relative frequencies for firm-months with and without repurchases across event months
Variable Event
months
Average
frequency
Median
frequency
Standard
deviation
Maximum
frequency
Minimum
frequency
p-Value Kolmogorov–
Smirnov
Relative frequency firm-months
with repurchases
19 5.26% 5.24% 0.3% 6.09% 4.23% 0.451
Relative frequency firm-months
without repurchases
19 5.26% 5.3% 0.41% 6.15% 4.1% –
Panel D: number of months in which a company repurchases stock within the 19-month sample period and REP (deﬁned as the ratio of monthly number of
repurchased shares over number of shares outstanding)
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard deviation Maximum Minimum
Firm-months with
repurchases
265 11.09 11 5.5 19 1
REP 5035 0.38% 0.08% 0.74% 15.95% 0%
The table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 5035 firm-months (2939 with repurchases and 2096 without repurchases) and REP, which is equal to the
number of shares repurchased by a company in amonth over the company's number of outstanding shares at the start of themonth. The 5035 firm-months are for 265
repurchasing companies (19 firm-months per company) that announced openmarket repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are identified through a search
on SDC PlatinumDatabase ofMergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Data on the
number of outstanding shares are from CRSP. Panel A provides the number of observations both for firm-months with repurchases and for firm-months without
repurchases and the shares of the two groups of observations in the overall sample of firm-months. Panel B shows descriptive statistics of the relative frequencies for
calendar firm-monthswith andwithout repurchases. For each calendarmonth, the relative frequency is the ratio between thenumberof observations of themonth and
the total number of observations. The panel also includes the p-value of a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to investigate whether the distributions of relative frequencies for
the two groups of observations are statistically different. The sample period comprises 30 calendar months (February 2004–July 2006). Panel C presents descriptive
statistics of the relative frequencies for event firm-monthswith andwithout repurchases. The panel also presents the p-value of a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to analyze
whether the distributions of relative frequencies for the two sub-samples are statistically different. There are 19 event months, and the event month 0 is the month in
which the announcement of an open market repurchase program takes place. Panel D reports descriptive statistics of the number of months in which a company
repurchases stock within the 19-month sample period and the variable REP.
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Panel B of Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the relative frequencies of firm-months with and without repurchases. The
p-value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test on the equality of the distributions is very small. This finding indicates that the
distribution across calendar months of firm-months with repurchases is statistically different from the distribution of firm-
months without repurchases. The structure of Panel C of Table 1 is similar to that of Panel B, but in Panel C we report descriptive
statistics on the distributions by event month. The large p-value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test suggests that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the frequency distributions for the two sub-samples of repurchase and non-repurchase firm-months are the
same. Panels B and C of Table 1 are based on Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1. These tables providemore details on the distributions of
the relative frequencies both by calendarmonth and by eventmonth. Finally, Panel D of Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on
the number of months in which a company repurchases stock within the 19-month post-announcement period. The mean (median)
number of months is 11.09 (11). Some companies make repurchases in each of the 19 months of the sample period whereas others
execute repurchases in only one of them.
Since our sample comprises only 265 companies, we want to verify how representative of the whole universe of U.S. listed
companies this sample is. We compare some characteristics of the companies in our sample with the same characteristics of the
overall set of U.S. companies with listed common stock (listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) that can be found in CRSP. At the
end of April 2005 (the mid-point of the sample period), we find 4795 U.S. companies in CRSP. The mean and the median market
values (price times the number of outstanding shares) for the universe of CRSP companies are $2,823,578,000 and $275,933,100
respectively at the end of April 2005. On the same date, the mean and the median market values of the companies in our sample
are $10,736,415,100 and $1,296,104,800 respectively. This shows that the companies in our sample are relatively large. At the end
of April 2005, 59% of the companies in CRSP are listed on NASDAQ, 31% on NYSE, and 10% on AMEX. In our sample, 49% of the
companies are listed on NASDAQ, 48% on NYSE, and 3% on AMEX.15 Hence, NYSE is over-represented and NASDAQ and AMEX are
under-represented in our dataset. In terms of industries where CRSP companies operate, 39% of the companies are in the
manufacturing industry (sic codes 2011–3999), 20% in the financial sector (sic codes 6011–6799), and 19% in the services sector (sic
codes 7011–8999). The remaining industries account for 22%. In our sample, 37% of the companies operate in the manufacturing
industry, 28% in the financial sector, and 18% in the services sector. Hence, financial companies are over-represented in our dataset.
3. Do companies time open market repurchases?
3.1. Motivation and research questions
Past survey evidence suggests that companies time their OMRs so as to buy back shares when they are undervalued. Brav et al.
(2005) find that 86.4% of U.S. companies surveyed state that the current market price of their stock is an important or a very
important factor to their repurchase decisions, in that their repurchase decision is based on whether their “stock is a good
investment, relative to its true value.” Brav et al. (2005) also conduct some follow-up interviews with executives. Around one half
of the interviewed executives state that “their firm tracks repurchase timing and that their firm can beat the market.” Moreover,
in the same interviews executives often say that repurchases are accelerated or initiated when the market price of their stock is
low in comparison with recent historical prices.
The quantitative empirical evidence on repurchase timing in the U.S. stock market is limited. Some previous literature focuses
on repurchase announcements and presents indirect evidence on the timing of repurchases. It shows that OMR announcements
are greeted by abnormal increases in stock prices (e.g., Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Vermaelen, 1981), and that companies
announcing OMR programs experience long-term abnormal increases in stock prices in the post-announcement period (Chan et
al., 2007; Ikenberry et al., 1995). These findings may indicate that companies tend to start repurchase programs when their stock
is undervalued in the market; investors see repurchase announcements as signals of undervaluation, and push stock prices up
through their trading on the announcement day and in the following months. This evidence is rather indirect given that actual
purchases of own stock do not necessarily follow repurchase announcements (Simkovic, 2009; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).
There is also some limited U.S. research on actual open market purchases of own stock offering more direct evidence on
repurchase timing. Stephens andWeisbach (1998) find an inverse relation between the number of repurchased shares in a quarter
and the abnormal return in the previous quarter. Chan et al. (2007) show that companies experiencing large positive abnormal
returns in the one-year period following a repurchase announcement repurchase less in the same period than companies with
small or zero post-announcement abnormal returns; this finding is consistent with the notion that a company repurchases less
when investors, as a result of a repurchase announcement signaling undervaluation, react more quickly and reduce or eliminate
the undervaluation of the company's stock. Cook et al. (2003) analyze a set of voluntarily disclosed daily repurchase transactions
for a sample of 54 companies (NYSE andNASDAQ companies). They find that companies repurchasemore after price declines. Cook
et al. (2004) use a similar dataset of voluntarily disclosed daily repurchases for 64 companies (NYSE and NASDAQ companies) and
compare the effective cost of a repurchase program with benchmark costs based on naïve repurchase strategies. They show that
the repurchase cost is lower than the benchmark costs for NYSE companies. Finally, Bozanic (2010) uses a dataset of monthly
repurchase data and finds that the repurchase volume in one month is negatively related to lagged stock returns and positively
associated with the difference between the leading average market price and the repurchase price in the current month.
15 In computing these percentages, we discard 3 companies from the sample of 265 companies because they switched their listing from one exchange to another
during the sample period.
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There is also evidence of repurchase timing outside the U.S. Brockman and Chung (2001) analyze a sample of daily repurchase
transactions fromHong Kong and show that the actual total cost of a repurchase program is on average lower than the bootstrapped
benchmark cost of the same program; in other words, the effective cost of repurchases is lower than a benchmark cost based on a
random repurchase strategy. Further evidence consistent with repurchase timing is provided for Canada (Ikenberry et al., 2000;
McNally and Smith, 2007; McNally et al., 2006), Hong Kong (Zhang, 2005), and France (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007).
Below, we re-examine and extend the results of these studies using our novel dataset of U.S. repurchase transactions. Specifically,
we testwhether (i) companiesmake OMRs after abnormal price declines and before abnormal price increases; (ii) companies tend to
repurchase stock on the open market at comparatively low prices; and (iii) the actual costs of repurchases are below a benchmark
estimate of expected costs.
3.2. Association between repurchase volume and prior and subsequent abnormal stock returns
Companies that time repurchase transactions will typically execute repurchases after abnormal stock price falls and before
abnormal price increases. Therefore, if companies time repurchase transactions, we expect that, all else equal, repurchase volume in a
given month is negatively associated with abnormal returns in previous months, and positively associated with abnormal returns in
subsequentmonths. In this section, abnormal return is defined as the difference between the stock return of a repurchasing company
minus the return on a market index. We use three alternative stock indices to proxy the market: the S&P Composite Index, the CRSP
value-weighted market index (comprising NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX companies), and the CRSP equally-weighted market index
(comprising NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX companies).
We use the dataset of “clean” repurchase volume data comprising 265 companies and 5035 firm-months. The dependent
variable is REP: for each-firmmonth, this variable is the number of shares repurchased in thatmonth divided by the number of shares
outstanding at the beginning of themonth. Since REP is censored at zero, we estimate Tobitmodels. As shown in Panel D of Table 1, in
the overall sample of 5035 firm-months themean of REP is 0.38%, its median is 0.08%, its maximum value is 15.95% (3.4% is the value
of the 99th percentile), and its minimum value is 0.16
Three of our Tobit models examine abnormal returns within one month around the repurchase month using the explanatory
variables MAR 0, MAR −1, and MAR +1. MAR 0 is the market-adjusted return for the current repurchase month, and MAR +1
(MAR−1) is the market-adjusted return for the month following (before) the current month. The remaining three models allow
a wider window of abnormal stock performance using windows of two months before and after the repurchase month: the
independent variablesMAR−1 to−2 andMAR+1 to+2 are the market-adjusted returns for the twomonths before and the two
months after the current month. We posit that a company holds unbiased estimates of the abnormal performance of its stock in
future months that it uses when choosing its repurchasing strategy. Hence, we includeMAR +1 andMAR +1 to +2 as measures
of the future abnormal returns expected by the company.
As a result of including lags and leads of market-adjusted returns among our explanatory variables, some observations of the
original sample of 5035 firm-months are dropped in the Tobit models (reducing the numbers of observations to 4505 and 3975,
respectively).
Table 2 reports the estimates of six Tobit models. In particular, there are two different specifications for each of the three
market indices used. Results are not qualitatively different across the three market indices. The coefficients on bothMAR−1 and
MAR −1 to −2 are negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. This indicates that there is a negative relation between the
market-adjusted returns in past months and themagnitude of repurchase activity in the current month. The coefficients onMAR+1
are negative but statistically insignificant. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn. By contrast, those onMAR+1 to +2 are positive and
significant at a 10% level. These findings show that there is a positive relation between the market-adjusted returns in future months
and the magnitude of repurchase activity in current months. On the whole, the evidence on the variablesMAR−1,MAR−1 to−2,
and MAR +1 to +2 indicates that repurchasing companies time their stock repurchases. Companies tend to repurchase more after
abnormal price declines than after abnormal price increases. Also, a company's repurchase activity is likely to be followed by
abnormal increases in stock price.
The coefficient on MAR 0 is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. This finding indicates that there is a negative
relation between the market-adjusted returns in the current month and the magnitude of repurchase activity in the same month.
Companies seem to choose months with abnormal price declines to buy back stock.
3.3. Abnormal returns around repurchases
To further test whether companies are able to time their OMR transaction, we analyze the abnormal returns of a company's stock
in months in which the company repurchases shares, and in months that either precede or follow share repurchases. If companies
16 Although some of the values of REP may appear to be large, they are consistent with trading volume data and regulations. Companies that repurchase their
own shares can protect themselves from the risk of liability for price manipulation by complying with the safe harbor of Rule 10b-18. To qualify for the safe
harbor, a ﬁrm must limit its daily repurchases to 25% of the average daily trading volume in the previous four calendar weeks. For example, in the four weeks
preceding the maximum of REP (15.59%) in May 2005, average daily turnover (the number of shares traded over the number of outstanding shares) was 5.93%. In
May 2005 the ﬁrm could have complied with the volume condition of the safe harbor with a REP of up to 31.13% (i.e. 5.93%×25%×21 days). Moreover,
compliance with the safe harbor is not mandatory.
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time their repurchases so that they buy back their stock when it is under-valued in the market, we expect months before repurchase
transactions to have negative abnormal returns and months that follow repurchases to have positive abnormal returns.
Based on the repurchase volume dataset containing 5035 firm-months, we estimate OLS regressions using as a dependent
variable the risk premium of a stock (R−Rf), i.e. the stock return in excess of the risk-free rate of return. For stock i and month t,
the dependent variable is computed as the average daily return on stock i in month t minus the average daily risk-free return in
the same month.
As explanatory variables in the regressions, we include Fama and French's (1993) three factors and Carhart's (1997) momentum
factor. In particular, we use average daily values of the factors.17 In the estimatedmodels, the Fama–French factors are represented by
the variables Rm−Rf, SMB, and HML. Rm−Rf is the average daily return on the market portfolio (average daily value-weighted
market return)minus the average daily risk-free return. SMB is the average daily difference between the return on a portfolio of small
stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks.HML is the average daily difference between the return on a portfolio of stockswith
high book-to-market ratios and the return on a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratios. Carhart's momentum factor, UMD,
is the average daily difference between the return on a portfolio of stockswith high past returns and the return on a portfolio of stocks
with low past returns.
The main explanatory variables of interest are a series of intercept dummy variables that reflect the incidence of repurchase
transactions in the previous, current, and subsequentmonths, and are designed to capture shifts in the constant, interpreted here as a
measure of abnormal return. MONTH 0 is a dummy that equals one for firm-months with a positive volume of share repurchases.
MONTH−1 (MONTH+1) is a dummy that is set to one if in thenext (previous)monthly period some repurchase transactions takeplace.
MONTHS−1 to−2 (MONTHS +1 to +2) is a dummy that is equal to one if in at least one of the next (previous) two monthly periods
some repurchases are carried out. As a result of the inclusion of these dummies in four of our six OLS regressions, some observations drop
out from the original sample of 5035 firm-months reducing the numbers of observations to 4505 and 3975, respectively.
The firm-month observations in our dataset are highly clustered over time since the sample period (February 2004–July 2006)
is quite short. Time-clustering can potentially induce cross-correlation in the observations which, in turn, can result in biases in
the standard errors and t-statistics on the OLS estimates. In our OLS regressions, we adjust the t-statistics on the OLS estimates by
taking into account the cross-correlation across errors of observations from the same calendar month (using Stata option cluster).
Table 3 presents the estimates of six specifications of the OLS regression. All six include the Fama–French (1993) factors and
three Carhart (1997) momentum factors among the explanatory variables. Also, four of the six regressions comprise MONTH
17 In 10-Ks and 10-Qs, the starting and ending dates of the three reporting periods in a quarterly reporting period do not always correspond to the starting and
ending dates of calendar months. Hence, we cannot use monthly data provided by CRSP for stock returns, risk-free return, Fama and French factors, and
momentum factor. Instead of monthly data, we use averages of daily data for days between actual starting and ending dates of reporting periods.
Table 2
Repurchase volume and market-adjusted returns.
Independent variables Dependent variable: REP
S&P Composite (i) VW index (ii) EW index(iii) S&P Composite (iv) VW index (v) EW index (vi)
MAR 0 −0.0101 *** −0.01 *** −0.0078 *** −0.0106 *** −0.0106 *** −0.0086 ***
(−4.65) (−4.6) (−3.62) (−4.59) (−4.57) (−3.73)
MAR −1 −0.018 *** −0.017 *** −0.0142 ***
(−8.06) (−7.7) (−6.49)
MAR +1 −0.003 −0.0032 −0.0032
(−1.4) (−1.47) (−1.5)
MAR −1 to −2 −0.0152 *** −0.015 *** −0.0135 ***
(−9.2) (−9.03) (−8.21)
MAR +1 to +2 0.0028 * 0.003 * 0.003 *
(1.74) (1.85) (1.86)
Constant 0.0003 * 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 * 0.0002 0.0001
(1.7) (1.04) (0.38) (1.81) (1.11) (0.45)
Observations 4505 4505 4505 3975 3975 3975
Log likelihood full model 6867.1126 6864.078 6851.3542 6097.2241 6095.6167 6084.9437
Log likelihood constant only 6822.441 6822.441 6822.441 6041.463 6041.463 6041.463
***: significant at 1%; *: significant at 10%.
The table contains estimates of Tobit regressions of a company's monthly number of repurchased shares on a set of market-adjusted returns on the company's
stock. Regressions are run on samples of firm-months for 265 companies that announced open market repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are
identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of
these companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Data on stock returns and returns on market indices are obtained from CRSP. For each firm-
month, REP is equal to the number of shares repurchased by the company in the month over the company's number of outstanding shares at the start of the
month.MAR is the return on the company's stock in the current month minus the return on a market index in the current month.MAR−1 (MAR+1) is the return on
the company's stock in the previous (following)monthminus the return on a market index in the previous (following) month.MAR−1 to−2 (MAR+1 to+2) is the
return on the company's stock in the previous (following) two months minus the return on a market index in the previous (following) two months. In
regressions (i) and (iv), the market index used to compute market-adjusted returns is the S&P's Composite Index. In regressions (ii) and (v), it is a value-weighted
market index (comprising NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX stocks), whereas in regressions (iii) and (vi) it is an equally-weightedmarket index (comprising NYSE, NASDAQ,
and AMEX stocks). For each regression, the table reports estimates of the constant, the number of observations, and the value of the log likelihood function both for the
estimated full model and for the model with only a constant. t-Statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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intercept dummies, either the dummies MONTH 0, MONTH −1, and MONTH +1 reflecting a three-month window around the
repurchase month, or the dummies associated with the wider five-month window:MONTH 0,MONTHS−1 to−2, andMONTHS+1
to +2.
Across the four regressions in columns (iii) to (vi), the coefficients on the variables MONTH −1 and MONTHS −1 to −2 are
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates that periods preceding repurchases tend to be
characterized by negative abnormal returns. The coefficients on the variablesMONTH+1 andMONTHS+1 to +2 are positive and
statistically significant at least at the 5% level, demonstrating that months following repurchase transactions have positive abnormal
returns. In sum, our results suggest that companies appear to time their repurchases by purchasing own stock after abnormal price
declines and before abnormal price increases.
Since the coefficient on the dummyMONTH 0 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, we conclude that repurchases
are carried out in periods characterized by negative abnormal returns.
The coefficients on Rm−Rf and SMB are positive and statistically significant at standard levels, whereas that on HML is not
significant. The coefficient on UMD is negative and either marginally statistically significant or insignificant at the 10% level. An
interesting finding is that the coefficient on the constant is always positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level in
four of the six regressions. Hence, there is some evidence of a residual positive abnormal return that cannot be explained by risk
factors and repurchase activity. Since our sample comprises firm-months for periods following announcements of repurchase
programs, the positive coefficient on the constant confirms previous evidence on the existence of long-term post announcement
positive abnormal returns (e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995; Ikenberry et al., 2000).
3.4. Comparisons of actual versus benchmark repurchase prices and costs
We expect that companies that successfully time their repurchases execute them at prices and costs that are lower than the
corresponding benchmark based on a naïve trading strategy. The naïve benchmarks are designed to reflect the prices and costs
faced by a company that does not time its repurchases. We expect such a company to repurchase stock at prices that are not
Table 3
Abnormal returns around firm-months with repurchase activity.
Independent
variables
Dependent variable: R−Rf
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Rm−Rf 0.9654⁎⁎⁎ 0.9869⁎⁎⁎ 0.9692⁎⁎⁎ 1⁎⁎⁎ 0.9737⁎⁎⁎ 1.01⁎⁎⁎
(11.88) (10.51) (10.6) (8.71) (11.61) (9.27)
SMB 0.3652⁎⁎⁎ 0.4339⁎⁎⁎ 0.3065⁎⁎ 0.3617⁎⁎⁎ 0.3137⁎⁎ 0.3638⁎⁎⁎
(3.6) (4.5) (2.45) (2.96) (2.45) (2.95)
HML −0.1057 0.0672 −0.1323 0.0591 −0.0611 0.1617
(−0.74) (0.39) (−0.88) (0.32) (−0.4) (0.86)
UMD −0.1936 −0.2047 −0.2329⁎
(−1.7) (−1.67) (−1.88)
MONTH 0 −0.0003⁎⁎⁎ −0.0004⁎⁎⁎ −0.0006⁎⁎⁎ −0.0006⁎⁎⁎
(−3.11) (−3.13) (−4.25) (−4.2)
MONTH −1 −0.0006⁎⁎⁎ −0.0006⁎⁎⁎
(−4.95) (−4.87)
MONTH +1 0.0003⁎⁎ 0.0003⁎⁎
(2.43) (2.51)
MONTHS −1 to −2 −0.0009⁎⁎⁎ −0.0009⁎⁎⁎
(−5.35) (−5.41)
MONTHS +1 to +2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(6.81) (7.1)
Constant 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006⁎⁎⁎ 0.0006⁎⁎⁎ 0.0004⁎⁎ 0.0004⁎⁎
(1.45) (1.68) (2.95) (3.05) (2.14) (2.27)
Observations 5035 5.035 4505 4505 3975 3975
Adjusted R-squared 0.1374 0.1389 0.1463 0.1478 0.1548 0.1564
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%: *: significant at 10%.
The table contains estimates of ordinary least squares regressions of a company's risk premium on a set of dummies based on the company's repurchase activity
and on standard risk factors. Regressions are run on samples of firm-months. Observations in the samples are for 265 companies that announced open market
repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers
and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Data on stock returns, market returns, risk-free
returns, and risk factors are obtained from CRSP. For each firm-month, the dummyMONTH 0 is equal to one if some repurchases are executed. The dummyMONTH−1
(MONTH +1) is set to one if repurchases are carried out in the following (previous) month. The dummyMONTHS−1 to−2 (MONTHS +1 to +2) is equal to one if
repurchases are executed in at least one of the two following (previous) months. R is the average daily return in the month and Rf is the average daily risk-free rate of
return. Rm is the average dailymarket return. Themarket return is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of U.S. stocks. SMB andHML are the average daily Fama and
French's size factor and the average daily Fama and French's book-to-market factor respectively. UMD is the average daily Carhart's momentum factor. For each
regression, the table reports estimates of the constant, the number of observations, and the adjusted R-squared. t-Statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering
across observations from the same calendar month are reported in parenthesis.
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systematically different from those at which the average investor would trade, i.e. the average market prices. In the first part of
this section, we compare the price at which a company executes repurchases on the market in a particular month with a
benchmark based on the average price of the company's stock in the same month. A repurchasing company can time repurchases
by taking advantage of private information that is not possessed by the average investor. If companies time their repurchases, we
expect the repurchase price to be lower than the benchmark price. In the second part, we analyze whether the total cost of a
company's repurchases over a 19-month period is on average lower or higher than the benchmark cost of the same amount of
repurchases based on the average price of the company's stock in that period.18 If companies time their repurchases, we expect
the effective total cost of repurchases to be lower than the benchmark.
The empirical analyses of this section are carried out on data that are adjusted to eliminate the contaminating effects of stock
splits, reverse splits, stock dividends, spin-offs, and similar transactions that artificially alter price and trading volume. Both
repurchase data (volume and price) from 10-Ks and 10-Qs and market data (stock price and volume) are adjusted.19
3.4.1. “Within-month” timing only: monthly average repurchase price vs. monthly average daily market closing price
We consider the sample of 4066 firm-month observations with “clean” repurchase price. On a monthly basis, we compare the
average price at which a company repurchases stock with a benchmark given by the average closing price of the stock in themarket.
We analyze whether in months with repurchases companies buy back stock at low prices. Hence, we investigate what we define as
“within-month” timing, which is the price advantage of buying back at relatively low prices within a particular month.20 For each of
the 2316 firm-months with repurchase activity, we compute the monthly average of the daily closing prices of the stock of the
company. This average is computed both as simple un-weighted average and as volume-weighted average. In this second case, the
price in each trading day isweighted by the corresponding daily trading volume over the totalmonthly trading volume. For each firm-
month, we calculate the variable %PRICE, as the ratio of the average repurchase price divided by the average daily closing priceminus
one (expressed as a percentage). The variable %PRICE is an inverse measure of repurchase timing: the greater the price advantage of
repurchases relative to the naïve benchmark the smaller, i.e. the more negative, the variable. There are two versions of the variable:
one based on the simple average closing price (%PRICES) and one based on the volume-weighted average closing price (%PRICEW).
For the variables %PRICES and %PRICEW, Panel A of Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and univariate tests on mean and
median values. Themaximum value of %PRICES (%PRICEW) is 21.543% (18.875%) and theminimum value of the variable is−21.624%
(−23.199%). Both themean (−0.619%) and themedian (−0.207%) of the variable %PRICES are negative and statistically significant at
a 1% level. This result indicates that, on average, repurchasing companies carry out repurchases on themarket at a price that is 0.619%
lower than the average closing price. Findings for the variable %PRICEW are very similar. Both its mean (−0.513%) and its median
(−0.147%) are negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. Based on this evidence, we conclude that consistent with repurchase
timing, companies buy back own stock on the open market at prices that are significantly below average market prices.
3.4.2. “Within-month” and “between-month” timing combined: effective versus benchmark cost of repurchases in 19-month
post-announcement period
The analysis of the previous sub-section compares actual and benchmark repurchase prices rather than costs (based on both
prices and repurchase volume). Also, the benchmark used in the last sub-section omits market price data from firm-months
without repurchase activity. The analysis in this sub-section uses the additional data on volume and non-repurchase firm-months.
For each of the 214 companies with “clean” repurchase price data we calculate the total cost of the repurchases executed over the
19-month period following a repurchase announcement by summing up the repurchase costs (repurchase price times repurchase
volume) over all themonthswith repurchase activity. For example, if a company repurchases 100,000 shares at an average price of $35
in onemonth and 150,000 shares at an average price of $37 in anothermonth, the total cost of repurchases is $9,050,000.We compare
the effective total cost of repurchases with a benchmark that is the total number of shares repurchased over the post-announcement
period times the average daily closing price over the same period. In the previous example, the total number of repurchased shares is
250,000; if the average closing price is $38, the benchmark total cost of repurchases is $9,500,000. Since our benchmark in this sub-
section depends on average market prices both from months with and without repurchases, we jointly investigate the presence of
“within-month” timing and “between-month” timing. The latter involves companies choosing months with relatively low prices to
execute repurchases.21 For each company, we create the variable %COST1, the percentage difference between the effective and
benchmark total cost of repurchases, defined as the ratio of the effective total cost divided by the benchmark total cost of repurchases
minus one (expressed as a percentage). The variable %COST1 is an inverse measure of the cost saving achieved by timing repurchases:
the lower the repurchase cost, the smaller, i.e. the more negative, the variable. In computing the benchmark cost, we either use the
un-weighted simple average daily price (%COST1S) or the volume-weighted average daily price (%COST1W).
For the variables %COST1S and %COST1W, descriptive statistics and univariate tests on mean and median values can be found in
Panel B of Table 4. Themaximumvalue of %COST1S (%COST1W) is 47.77% (72.413%) and theminimumvalue of the variable is−47.91%
(−50.428%). The mean of %COST1S (−2.77%) is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. The median of the variable
(−1.767%) is also negative and statistically different from zero at the same level of significance. These findings indicate that
18 For a given month, the cost of repurchases is given by the repurchase volume times the average repurchase price.
19 In order to adjust repurchase price and volume data, we use information on stock splits, reverse splits, stock dividends, spin-offs, and similar transactions
from 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and CRSP. Market data are adjusted based on information from CRSP.
20 See Appendix 2 for examples that illustrate the calculation of the “within-month” timing measure.
21 See Appendix 2 for examples that illustrate the calculation of the “between-month” timing measure.
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companies, when repurchasing stock in the post-announcement period, spend less thanwhat they would spend if repurchases were
executed at the average market price over the period. Results are not qualitatively different for the variable %COST1W. Both themean
(−2.837%) and the median (−1.235%) of this variable are negative and statistically different from zero at the 1% level. As shown in
Section 3.4.4 below, the cost savings are also economically significant. Overall, this evidence indicates that consistent with companies
timing their repurchases, the actual cost of repurchases in the post-announcement period is significantly lower than the benchmark
cost based on average market prices. The greater cost savings for “within-month” and “between-month” timing together, compared
to “within-month” timing alone (in the previous sub-section), suggests that companies reduce the cost of their repurchases not only
by timing their repurchaseswithin eachmonth, but also by repurchasingmore shares inmonths inwhichprevailingmarket prices are
relatively low.
3.4.3. “Between-month” timing only: estimated versus benchmark cost of repurchases in the post-announcement period
In this section, we use both the sample of 265 companies with “clean” repurchase volume data and the sub-sample of 214
companies with reliable repurchase price data. For each company, we estimate the cost of repurchases in each of the 19 months
following the company's repurchase announcement assuming that repurchases are executed at a monthly average of the daily
closing price of the company's stock. For example, if in a month a company repurchases 250,000 shares and the average closing
price in that month is $15, the estimated cost of repurchases is $3,750,000. We use both un-weighted and volume-weighted
averages of closing prices. We find the total “estimated” cost of repurchases in the 19-month post-announcement period by
cumulating the monthly costs of repurchases. We compare this total estimated cost with a benchmark total cost of repurchases
that is the number of shares repurchased in the post-announcement period times the average of the daily closing price over the
19-month post-announcement period. Since the estimated cost is based on average market prices for months with repurchases
rather than actual repurchase prices, we do not test for the presence of “within-month” timing. We only investigate the presence
of “between-month” timing. For each company, we calculate the variable %COST2S, which is the percent difference between the
estimated cost and the benchmark cost of repurchases over the 19-month post-announcement period. More specifically, %COST2S,
which is expressed as a percentage, is the estimated total cost of repurchases over the benchmark total cost of repurchases, minus
one. We also create the variable %COST2W that differs from %COST2S in two ways. First, in estimating the cost of repurchases,
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables %PRICES, %PRICEW, %COST1S, %COST1W, %COST2S, and %COST2W.
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
Panel A: % difference between monthly repurchase price and monthly average daily market price
%PRICES 2316 −0.619 *** −0.207 *** 2.926 −0.945 8.7481 21.543 −21.624
%PRICEW 2316 −0.513 *** −0.147 *** 2.875 −1.015 9.381 18.875 −23.199
Panel B: % difference between effective total cost of repurchases and benchmark total cost of repurchases in the post-announcement period
%COST1S 214 −2.77 *** −1.767 *** 11.054 0.529 6.082 47.77 −47.91
%COST1W 214 −2.837 *** −1.235 *** 12.157 0.788 10.04 72.413 −50.428
Panel C: % difference between estimated total cost of repurchases and benchmark total cost of repurchases in the post-announcement period: sample with accurate
repurchase volume data
%COST2S 265 −2.183 *** −1.126 *** 9.919 0.302 6.44 47.5 −47.722
%COST2W 265 −2.474 *** −0.915 *** 10.979 0.603 11.468 71.889 −50.636
Panel D: % difference between estimated total cost of repurchases and benchmark total cost of repurchases in the post-announcement period: sample with accurate
repurchase volume and repurchase price data
%COST2S 214 −1.998 *** −1.126 *** 10.435 0.407 6.197 47.5 −47.722
%COST2W 214 −2.263 *** −0.634 *** 11.595 0.711 11.086 71.889 −50.636
***: significant at 1%.
The table reports descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the mean and median values of the variables %PRICES, %PRICEW, %COST1S, %COST1W, %COST2S, and
%COST2W. In the first panel of the table (panel A), the dataset under analysis comprises 2316 firm-months with repurchase activity. In the other three panels
(panel B, panel C, and panel D), the two datasets consist of 214 and 265 companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are identified
through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these
companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Data on market stock prices and market stock trading volumes are obtained from CRSP. For each firm-
month with repurchase activity, %PRICES is the percent difference between the average repurchase price and the average daily closing price of the company's
stock. The percent difference is 100 times the difference between the average repurchase price and the average daily price over the average daily price. For each
firm-month, %PRICEW is the percent difference between the average repurchase price and the volume-weighted average daily closing price of the company's
stock. Trading volume data for the company's stock are used to compute this volume-weighted average. For each company, %COST1S is the percent difference
between the effective total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based
on the assumption that stock is repurchased at the stock's average daily closing price over the 19 months. %COST1W differs from %COST1S in that the benchmark used is
computed assuming that repurchases are executed at the volume-weighted average closing daily price. For each company, %COST2S is the difference between the
estimated total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the
assumption that stock is repurchased at the stock's average daily closing price over the 19 months. The monthly estimated total cost of repurchases is the number of
repurchased shares times the average daily closing price over the month; monthly estimated costs are cumulated to find the estimated total cost of repurchases over
the 19-month period. %COST2W differs from %COST2S in two ways. First, in each month, the estimated cost of repurchases is computed using the volume-weighted
average daily price. Second, the benchmark cost of repurchases is calculated assuming that stock is repurchased at the volume-weighted average daily price. For each
variable, the table shows the number of observations, the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the skewness, the kurtosis, the maximum value, and the minimum
value of the variable. It also reports the significance levels of Student's t-tests on means and of Mann–Whitney tests on medians.
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%COST2S uses un-weighted simple average closing prices whereas %COST2W uses volume-weighted average closing prices.
Second, for %COST2S the benchmark cost of repurchases is based on the un-weighted simple average closing price whereas for
%COST2W it is based on the volume-weighted average closing price.
For the variables %COST2S and %COST2W, Panels C and D of Table 4 present descriptive statistics and univariate tests on mean
and median values. In both panels, the maximum value of %COST2S (%COST2W) is 47.5% (71.889%) and the minimum value of the
variable is −47.722% (−50.636%). In the larger sample with 265 observations, both the mean (−2.183%) and the median
(−1.126%) of %COST2S are negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. These results indicate that repurchasing companies
buy back stock in months with relatively low prices. Findings are very similar for the variable %COST2W. Its mean (−2.474%) and
its median (−0.915%) are negative and statistically different from zero at a 1% level. As for the sub-sample with 214 observations,
the mean value of %COST2S (%COST2W) is−1.998% (−2.263%). Further, the median values of %COST2S and %COST2W are−1.126%
and−0.634% respectively.We can conclude that consistent with repurchase timing, companies execute repurchases inmonths with
average market prices that are significantly lower than those of months without repurchases.
3.4.4. Discussion of the main ﬁndings and economic signiﬁcance
Overall we find that companies time OMRs both by buying shares at a relatively low price within each month in which the
company repurchases shares and by buying more shares duringmonths when prevailingmarket prices are relatively low. Through a
combination of “within-month” and “between-month” timing, companies repurchase stock for roughly 2.8% below benchmark costs
(see Panel B of Table 4). The majority of this trading gain comes from “between-month” timing, i.e., concentrating repurchases in
months during which prevailing market prices are relatively low. In particular, in Panel D of Table 4 we report that owing to
“between-month” timing repurchasing companies enjoy savings that range from 2% to 2.3% of the benchmark costs. Appendix 2
presents some simple examples that further clarify the difference between “within-month” timing and “between-month” timing.
To evaluate the economic significance of the costs companies save through both “between-month” timing and “within-
month” timing, we proceed as follows. First, for each of the 214 companies in the sub-sample with accurate repurchase price data,
we compute two absolute measures of cost savings by multiplying the values of %COST1S and %COST1W by their respective
benchmark costs. These benchmarks, which are defined in Section 3.4.2, are either based on average un-weighted daily prices or
on volume-weighted average daily prices. The median values of the two absolute measures of cost savings are−$336,530 and−
$209,073. Second, we calculate the ratios between the two absolute measures of cost savings and either the company's market
value of equity (i.e. market capitalization) at the start of the sample period of 19 months or the company's book value of total
assets for the latest fiscal year before the start of this period. Wemultiply each of the resulting four ratios by 100 to obtain percent
measures of cost savings that are proportional to measures of company size. Finally, we calculate descriptive statistics for the four
percent measures. The mean percent cost savings scaled by market capitalization are −0.24% (−0.1%) and −0.25% (−0.05%),
respectively. The mean (median) values are roughly−0.54% (−0.04%) for measures scaled by total assets. These findings imply that
the average cost savings over a 19-month period account for between 0.24% and 0.25% of a company's market capitalization and for
0.54% of a company's total assets. The maximum cost savings in the sample are equal to between 7.01% and 7.76% of market
capitalization and to between 25.5% and 28.21% of total assets.We can conclude that the cost savings companiesmake over a 19-month
period by timing OMRs correspond to a non-negligible portion of their market capitalizations and book values of total assets.
3.5. Alternative explanations
Even though the findings reported in the previous sections (Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4) are clearly consistent with repurchase
timing, it is important to analyze whether there are alternative explanations.
Some of our findings could be explained by price support rather than timing. It is possible that companies use repurchases to
support their stock prices. Price support activities are likely to take place after price declines. The evidence we report in this paper,
particularly in Tables 2 and 3, confirms that companies' propensity to purchase own stock is larger after falls in the prices of their
shares. However, activities aimed at supporting stock prices cannot explain the abnormal price increases after periods with stock
repurchases (see Tables 2 and 3). By contrast, wewould expect to observe such increases if in fact companies do time their repurchases.
Announcements of repurchase programs may signal stock undervaluation, and probably for this reason, they are followed by
positive short-term abnormal returns (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). However, in our
case, the short-term reactions to repurchase announcements cannot drive our findings because firm-months with announcements
are excluded fromour samples. Research on repurchase announcements also reports long-termpositive abnormal returns in the post-
announcement periods (e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995, 2000). It could be argued that our finding that actual repurchase prices and costs
are lower than benchmark prices and costs (as reported in Section 3.4) may be due to the long-term abnormal returns following
repurchase announcements. This would be the case if repurchase transactionsmostly took place in the first few (event) months after
repurchase announcements that are followed by positive long-term abnormal returns. However, we observe no statistically
significant variation in the frequency of repurchase transactions across event months (as highlighted in Section 2.5 and Panel C of
Table 1). Figure A1 in Appendix 1 provides further evidence that repurchase transactions are not systematically clustered in the first
few event months after repurchase announcements. The figure reports average values of repurchase volume, as measured by the
variable REP, across eventmonths. The time-series mean of REP averaged across stocks is the same for the first and the last nine event
months (0.37%). We conclude that abnormal returns caused by repurchase announcements are unlikely to explain our findings.
Announcements of executed repurchase transactionsmay also signal undervaluation and generate positivemarket reactions. Zhang
(2005) finds that in Hong Kong the cumulative abnormal return on the repurchase day and the subsequent two days, duringwhich the
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transaction is disclosed, is positive and statistically significant. Similar evidence is reported byWang et al. (2009) for the U.K. In the U.S.
repurchase transactions are not disclosed immediately but only when companies file their 10-Q and 10-K reports (as outlined in
Section 2). We investigate whether investors' responses on disclosure days of 10-Qs and 10-Ks drive some of our results. We create
monthly dummies that identify the two firm-months after the end of 10-Q periods and the three firm-months after the end of 10-K
periods.22We re-estimate the regressions of Table 3with these dummies. The two10-Qdummies have a statistically significant positive
impact on stock returns. The same is true for the 10-K dummy that identifies the second month after the end of a fiscal period.
Importantly, the coefficients onMONTH+1 andMONTH+1TO+2 are still positive and significant. These results suggest that abnormal
stock returns follow repurchase transactions even after controlling for the stock price reaction to transaction disclosures.
Overall, we conclude that our results are indicative of timing rather than being driven by common alternative explanations.
4. Determinants of open market repurchase timing
4.1. Informed ownership and the information effect
Next, we examine the determinants of the profits (through price advantages and cost savings) companies realize by timing
OMRs.We expect the company to realize lower profits or cost savings by timing repurchases when a higher proportion of a company's
outstanding shares are held by informed investors. We argue that this “information effect” arises because more informed ownership
results inmore informed trading, which in turn renders the stock pricemore informative and undervaluation of the stock rarer and less
pronounced. As a result, there is less opportunity for companies to profit from repurchases timed to exploit temporary undervaluation.
As both insiders and institutions are normally consideredwell-informed investors (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Sias et al., 2006), both insider and
institutional ownership may give rise to an “information effect”.
We expect informed ownership to be positively associated with informed trading. Our expectation is supported by Aslan et al.
(2011) who report that ownership by informed investors (i.e. insider ownership and large institutional holdings) positively
impacts the probability of informed trading. Furthermore, previous research finds that trades by insiders are more common for
companies with higher insider ownership (Demsetz, 1986; Sarin et al., 1999).
The impact of informed trading on the informativeness of share prices has been demonstrated theoretically. A singlemonopolistic
informed trader is expected to trade in such a way that her private information is incorporated in the share price only gradually
(e.g., Kyle, 1985). By contrast, with larger numbers of informed traders more private information is revealed more quickly as
informed traders compete for trading profits; and as prices become more informative the rents available to private information are
dissipated (Kyle, 1984; O'Hara, 1995). As the number of informed traders increases, their optimal strategy becomesmore competitive
(Holden and Subrahmanyan, 1992; O'Hara, 1995). Overall, when competition from informed trading increases, there is a reduction in
the potential timing profits companies can make through repurchases.
There is no lack of empirical evidence supporting the notion that both insiders and institutions trade on price-relevant information
and that by doing so they facilitate price discovery and boost price informativeness. Starting from institutional investors,23 Chen et al.
(2000) show that stocks recently bought bymutual funds outperform stocks thatwere recently sold bymutual funds. Ali et al. (2004)
find that changes in institutional ownership in one quarter are positively related to the abnormal returns recorded when quarterly
earnings are announced in the following periods. This evidence supports the notion that institutions have private information on
future earnings surprises and that they trade on this information. Yan and Zhang (2009) find that trades by institutions with short
term investment horizons predict future stock returns and earnings. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) show that trades by institutions
facilitate the incorporation of the company-specific component of future earnings into stock prices. Similarly, Boehmer and Kelley
(2009) analyze the relation between informational efficiency and institutional ownership. They document that prices of stocks with
greater institutional ownership more closely follow a random walk process.
As for insiders, existing empirical evidence shows that they trade on information that is not already reflected in market prices
(e.g., Ke et al., 2003; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Seyhun, 1986) and that legal trading by insiders
facilitates price discovery (Aktas et al., 2008). This evidence supports the widely-accepted notion that insiders are likely to have more
information that most outside investors.24 If trades by insiders convey private information, the relation between informational
efficiency and insider ownership should be positive. Consistent with this inference, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find that the profits generated
by insider trades are a negative function of insider ownership.
The measure of informed ownership we use is the sum of insider and institutional ownership (INSO+INSTO).25 For a particular
company, INSO is the percentage of the company's outstanding shares held by all the company's officers and directors on the last proxy
22 In constructing these dummy variables we take into account the SEC rules (during our sample period) that companies must submit their ﬁlings within
75 days (for accelerated ﬁlers) to 90 days (for non-accelerated ﬁlers) after the end of the ﬁscal period for 10-Ks and within 40 or 45 days for 10-Qs (for
accelerated and non-accelerated ﬁlers, respectively).
23 The existing literature in the area is particularly large. In this section, we do not aim to thoroughly review this literature. We primarily focus on some recent
research papers that we consider of particular interest.
24 This does not mean that all insiders are always better informed than any outside investor. Some outside shareholders may accumulate private information by
analyzing public information through sophisticated and uncommonmethods of investment analysis. By doing so, they may become better informed than insiders.
25 Insider ownership plus long-term institutional holdings can also be interpreted as one minus the “free ﬂoat”, where the free ﬂoat is the proportion of shares
that are readily available for trading in the market. The smaller the free ﬂoat, the larger may be the price impact of repurchase transactions, and the smaller the
timing proﬁts. We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this interpretation. However, as we control for price impact and stock liquidity by including two
widely-used liquidity measures discussed in Section 4.2, we do not interpret INSO+INSTO as a price-impact measure.
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statement date before the start of the 19-month period that follows the company's repurchase announcement (post-announcement
period). The variable INSTO is the percentage of the company's outstanding shares held by all institutional investors on the end-of-
quarter date before the initiation of the company's post-announcement period that is nearest to the date of the proxy statement used to
collect insider ownership data.
4.2. Insider ownership and the wealth effect
We recognize that the impact of insider ownership on profits from timing repurchases may not necessarily be negative as
predicted by the information effect outlined above. Instead we expect a countervailing effect as larger insider ownership increases
the incentives for insiders to trade on private information using repurchases as a substitute for direct insider transactions. The
execution of repurchases at comparatively low prices transfers wealth from “selling shareholders” (shareholders that sell their
stock back) to non-selling shareholders. Fried (2005) argues that by repurchasing shares at less than fair value, informed insiders
(who are unlikely to sell at such prices) extract wealth from selling shareholders (who tend to be less informed). Non-selling
shareholders benefit from this wealth transfer pro rata in relation to their pre-repurchase shareholdings. The higher the insiders'
shareholdings the more they stand to benefit and the greater their incentive to time repurchases. This “wealth transfer effect”
predicts a positive relation between profits from repurchase timing and insider ownership.
It is reasonable to expect that insider ownership has both a wealth transfer effect and an information effect. As the relative
strengths of the two effects may vary depending on the level of inside ownership, it is possible that the relation between insider
ownership and repurchase timing is non-linear. For instance, at low levels of informed ownership the positive wealth transfer
effect of inside information may offset its negative information effect; while the information effect may prevail at high levels of inside
information.Wehaveno ex ante expectations regarding the relative strengths of the twoeffects over various ranges of inside ownership;
instead we expect our empirical analysis to shed light on the matter.
4.3. Liquidity
We argue that another determinant of the profitability of repurchase timing is stock liquidity. Previous research shows the
impact of repurchase transactions on stock liquidity. While Brockman and Chung (2001) find that repurchases reduce liquidity,
Cook et al. (2004) document the opposite effect. More recently, Brockman et al. (2008) study the impact of liquidity on
repurchase decisions and show that a stock's liquidity is a determinant of the company's payout policy. By contrast, our analysis
examines the impact of liquidity on the cost savings and price advantages achieved by companies timing repurchase transactions.
Repurchase transactions are likely to have greater price impact on less liquid stocks, increasing the actual open-market stock
price at which shares are repurchased (relative to the benchmark price) and raising the total cost of repurchasing (relative to the
benchmark). Likewise, companies with higher transaction costs of repurchasing in terms of bid–ask spread find it harder to
repurchase stock at comparatively low prices (relative to the benchmark cost). Thus, we expect a negative relation between the
profits from timing repurchase transactions and measures of transaction costs and stock liquidity. The potential endogeneity of
liquidity is explored in Section 4.7 below.
We use the illiquidity ratio developed by Amihud (2002) as a measure of price impact.26 AMIHUD is calculated as the average
value of one million times the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio defined as the absolute value of daily return over daily dollar volume.
We also consider an alternative liquiditymeasure, namely the bid–ask spread. SPREAD is defined as the average daily relative bid–ask
spread, which is the difference between ask and bid prices over the average of the two prices. AMIHUD and SPREAD are computed
using daily data from the post-announcement period.
4.4. Other determinants
We also investigate the relations between the timing of repurchases and the following other possible determinants.27 First, we
argue that companies with highly volatile stocks may have more opportunities to repurchase stock at comparatively low prices
than companies with more stable stock prices. To measure stock return volatility we create the variable SD, which is the standard
deviation of a company's stock daily return over the post-announcement period.
The “fair value” of the stocks of small companies is likely to be less precisely known by investors than that of large andwell-known
companies. Hence, small companies should bemore able than large companies to timeOMRs. Asmeasure of company sizewe useMV.
This variable is the natural logarithm of a company's market capitalization (number of outstanding shares in thousands times stock
price) on the last trading day before the start of the post-announcement period. The empirical findings are qualitatively similar if
instead of MV we use the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in our analyses.
26 The Amihud illiquidity ratio is easy to compute using widely-available daily data. We choose it as a price impact measure based on Goyenko et al. (2009), who
show that the Amihud ratio is highly positively correlated with price impact measures based on intraday data. They also conclude that the Amihud ratio is
normally preferable or not signiﬁcantly worse than alternative daily price impact measures.
27 Cook et al. (2004) ﬁnd that NYSE ﬁrms have signiﬁcant timing skills when repurchasing stock whereas Nasdaq ﬁrms do not make any timing gains. We
therefore consider adding a dummy variable as a timing determinant to separate observations for NYSE and AMEX ﬁrms from those for NASDAQ ﬁrms. We do not
ﬁnd support for Cook et al.'s (2004) results in that the dummy is never statistically signiﬁcant in our analyses. These results are not reported in the tables below
but are available from the authors on request.
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We also consider the variables CASH, CF, and MB among the possible determinants of repurchase timing. These variables are
calculated using market and accounting data relating to the last fiscal year that does not comprise parts of the post-announcement
period. CASH is the value, at year end, of cash and short-term investments (Compustat item 1) scaled by the value, at year end, of total
assets (Compustat item 6). CF is the value of operating income before depreciation and amortization (Compustat item 13) scaled by
the end-of-year value of total assets. CF is a measure of cash flow.MB is the market-to-book ratio. To bemore specific, it is the sum of
the end-of-year values ofmarket capitalization (inmillions) and total liabilities (Compustat item181) scaled by the value, at year end,
of total assets. Cash-rich companies (with high values of CASH and CF) are financially very flexible and can always find spare cash to
repurchase stock whenever their own stock can be bought at a “cheap” price. In contrast, companies with low levels of CASH and CF
may sometimes be forced to pass up good trading opportunities in their own stock owing to the lack of cash. On the whole, we may
expect cash-rich companies to be able to time repurchases more than companies with low levels of liquid resources.MB is a measure
of growth opportunities. Companies with a lot of growth opportunities (highMB) may be more reluctant to use cash to repurchase
stock. These companiesmay prefer to retain high levels of liquid resources to finance future investments. The opposite can be said for
companieswith few growth opportunities (lowMB). Overall, companieswith lowMB couldmake repurchases in amore flexibleway
than companies with highMB. We may expect to find an inverse relation between a company'sMB and the company's profits from
timing repurchases.
4.5. Methodology and descriptive statistics
Weanalyze the relation between a company's profits from timingOMRs and the potential determinants (explanatory variables) of
repurchase timinghighlighted in the previous sections.Weuse six different (inverse)measures of timing profits (“timingmeasures”).
The first two of these measures are A%PRICES, the value of %PRICES (as defined in Section 3.4.1) averaged over all the months in
which the company repurchases shares, and A%PRICEW, defined as the average over repurchase months of the variable %PRICEW
(Section 3.4.1). The other four timingmeasures %COST1S, %COST1W, %COST2S, and %COST2W are as defined in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
A decrease in any of the six timing measures reflects an increase in a company's profits from timing repurchases, and vice versa. We
observe values of the variables A%PRICES, A%PRICEW, %COST1S, and %COST1W for a sample of 214 companies, and of the variables
%COST2S and %COST2W for a larger sample of 265 companies.
Descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables are reported in Table 5. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample of
214 companies that is used in the regressions with the dependent variables A%PRICES, A%PRICEW, %COST1S, and %COST1W. Panel B
presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 265 companies that is usedwhen the dependent variables are %COST2S and %COST2W.
In Panel A, the mean (median) value of the variable INSO is 8.17% (3.67%). The mean (median) value of the variable INSTO is 62.84%
(70.108%). Mean and median values of the variables INSO and INSTO are very similar in Panel B.28 The mean value of the variable
INSO+INSTO (the sum of INSO and INSTO) is 71% and its median value is 78.25%.
For company i, the baseline multivariate model we estimate in this section is described by Eq. (1):
TimingMeasurei ¼ β0 þ β1OwnershipVariablesi þ β2Liquidityi þ β3SDi
þβ4MV i þ β5CASHi þ β6CFi þ β7MBi þ ei:
ð1Þ
The “timingmeasure” is alternately one of A%PRICES, A%PRICEW, %COST1S, %COST1W, %COST2S or %COST2W. “Ownership variables”
specified alternately as (i) informed ownership, measured as the sum of insider and institutional ownership (INSO+INSTO),
(ii) insider ownership INSO and institutional ownership INSTO separately, or (iii) institutional ownership INSTO, and insider
ownership INSO and its square INSO². In some of the specifications the explanatory variables include INSO² to allow for a possible
quadratic relation between the insider ownership and the timing measures. “Liquidity” is either AMIHUD or SPREAD. e is the error
term. In every regression, we include a set of industry dummies that are based on the ten main groups of SIC codes.29 We adopt
Ordinary Least Squares to estimate several versions of baseline regression (1).
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the regression variables. Correlation coefficients across pairs of explanatory variables
that appear in the same regressions are sometimes quite high. Specifically, we have relatively large correlation coefficients for the
following pairs of variables: SPREAD-MV and CF-MB. Nevertheless, the coefficients never reach levels that could undermine the
validity of the regression findings.We formally test this conclusion by running the regressionswith the four variables dropped one at
a time. The results of these regressions are qualitatively similar to those with the original full set of variables.
28 There are 9 observations in the sample with 214 companies and 10 observations in the sample with 265 companies with values of INSTO exceeding 100%.
Asquith et al. (2005) provide a logical explanation for this apparent puzzle. When a stock is sold short, two different institutional investors may formally own the
stock at the same time: the investor from which the short seller borrows the stock and the investor to whom the short seller subsequently sells the stock. Short
sales can inﬂate INSTO and push its value above the 100% threshold. Hence, we do not discard observations with a value of INSTO exceeding 100%.
29 We omit the industry dummies from Eq. (1), and do not report coefﬁcient estimates for the dummies in the tables; the results are available from the authors
on request. As our sample includes companies from the ﬁnancial sector, we investigate ﬁnance sector-speciﬁc effects by including interaction terms between the
ﬁnance industry dummy and the explanatory variables CASH, CF, and MB to test whether these variables have a signiﬁcant incremental impact among ﬁnancial
companies on the timing measures. Overall, we conclude that there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences between ﬁnancial and industrial companies. These
results are not reported in the tables below but are available from the authors on request.
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4.6. Empirical ﬁndings
Table 7 shows the estimated regressions of the six timing measures on informed ownership (the sum of insider and institutional
ownership, INSO+INSTO), stock liquidity measured either by the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIHUD) or the relative bid–ask spread
(SPREAD), and the other explanatory variables outlined in Section 4.4. Across the twelve regressions, the coefficient on INSO+INSTO is
always positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level of significance. This finding suggests that an increase in informed
ownership (the shareholdings of insiders and institutions) in a company leads to a reduction in the company's profits from repurchasing
stock at comparatively low prices. It appears that companies have fewer opportunities to time repurchases if a larger share of their stock
is held by insiders and institutions. This is consistent with the information effect outlined in Section 4.1: more informed ownership
reduces the opportunities available for companies to time OMRs.
Another statistically significant finding is the positive relation between the two liquidity measures AMIHUD and SPREAD and the
six timing measures. From a statistical viewpoint, this relation is stronger for AMIHUD than for SPREAD. The positive sign of this
relation indicates that an increase in the transaction costs (price impact of transactions or bid–ask spread) companies face when
repurchasing stock causes a reduction in the potential cost savings of repurchasesmade at relatively lowprices. The coefficients of the
other explanatory variables are normally not statistically different from zero. In only four cases out of twelve, the coefficient of
MV is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of CASH is negative and significant only in three regressions. It is worth
highlighting that the overall explanatory power of the regressions is quite large, with adjusted R-squared ranging from 8.25% to
27.03%.
In Table 8, we split INSO+INSTO into its two components to examine the separate effects of the two classes of owners: insiders
and institutional investors. It is conceivable that the relative strength of the information effect differs between the two types of
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for the variables INSO, INSTO, INSO+INSTO, AMIHUD, SPREAD, SD, MV, CASH, CF, and MB.
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum 1st percentile 1st quartile 3rd quartile 99th percentile Maximum
Panel A: repurchase price dataset
INSO 214 8.168 3.67 11.859 0.07 0.08 1.13 9.44 57.12 80.6
INSTO 214 62.837 70.108 28.905 0.33 1.66 40.765 86.413 108.004 117.294
INSO+INSTO 214 71.005 78.246 25.265 7.33 15.273 55.869 90.083 109.233 119.024
AMIHUD 214 0.313 0.002 2.011 0.00001 0.00001 0.0004 0.02 4.401 27.135
SPREAD 214 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.003 0.026 0.038
SD 214 0.019 0.018 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.023 0.041 0.055
MV 214 13.82 13.694 1.847 9.241 10.417 12.436 14.97 18.826 18.842
CASH 214 0.203 0.123 0.203 0.0003 0.004 0.035 0.328 0.793 0.897
CF 214 0.132 0.123 0.113 −0.146 −0.063 0.033 0.187 0.537 0.579
MB 214 2.179 1.633 1.58 0.691 0.768 1.094 2.471 8.66 10.332
Panel B: repurchase volume dataset
INSO 265 7.796 3.13 12.164 0.07 0.08 0.82 8.44 58.23 80.6
INSTO 265 63.361 69.361 27.216 0.33 1.66 46.196 84.008 108.004 117.294
INSO+INSTO 265 71.157 77.262 23.859 7.33 15.273 57.623 88.633 109.303 119.024
AMIHUD 265 0.253 0.001 1.81 0.00001 0.00001 0.0003 0.009 4.401 27.135
SPREAD 265 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.003 0.026 0.038
SD 265 0.018 0.017 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.023 0.041 0.055
MV 265 14.156 14.13 1.977 9.241 10.417 12.661 15.406 19.197 19.773
CASH 265 0.186 0.102 0.193 0.0003 0.002 0.034 0.286 0.793 0.897
CF 265 0.136 0.127 0.116 −0.146 −0.063 0.038 0.187 0.564 0.739
MB 265 2.202 1.66 1.581 0.691 0.768 1.117 2.574 9.355 10.605
The table contains descriptive statistics for the variables INSO, INSTO, INSO+INSTO, AMIHUD, SPREAD, SD, MV, CASH, CF, and MB for two samples: one with 214
(panel A) and one with 265 (panel B) companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. The companies in the two samples are identified through a search
of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. For each repurchasing company, a 19-month sample period is
identified. The first month in the sample period is that following the month in which the company announces a repurchase program. Data on insider ownership
and on ownership by institutional investors are obtained from proxy statements and from Thomson Financial respectively. Market data on stock prices, stock
returns, trading volumes, ask and bid prices, and numbers of outstanding shares are downloaded from CRSP. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat. For
each company, INSO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all the company's officers and directors on the last proxy statement date before the start
of the 19-month sample period. INSTO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors (required to file Form 13F) on the end-of-
quarter date before the initiation of the 19-month sample period that is nearest to the date of the proxy statement that is used to collect INSO. INSO+INSTO is the
sum of INSO and INSTO. AMIHUD is the average value of 1,000,000 times the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio (absolute value of daily return over daily dollar volume)
in the sample period. SPREAD is the average daily relative bid–ask spread (difference between ask and bid prices over the average of the two prices) in the sample
period. SD is the standard deviation of the daily return over the sample period.MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (stock price multiplied by
the number of outstanding shares in thousands) on the last trading day before the start of the sample period. The variables CASH, CF, andMB are computed using
market and accounting data for the last fiscal year that does not include parts of the sample period. CASH is the end-of-year value of cash and short-term investments
(Compustat item1) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets (Compustat item6). CF is the annual value of operating income before depreciation and amortization
(Compustat item 13) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets.MB is the sum of the values of market capitalization (in millions) and total liabilities (Compustat
item 181), both at year end, scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. For each variable, the table shows the number of observations, the mean, the median, the
standard deviation, theminimum value, the value of the 1st percentile, the value of the 1st quartile, the value of the 3rd quartile, the value of the 99th percentile, and the
maximum value of the variable.
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informed investor. Further, as explained above, there may be a wealth effect of insider ownership (which is absent for institutional
investors). We present estimates of regressions of the six timing measures on insider ownership (INSO), institutional ownership
(INSTO), stock liquidity measured either by the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIHUD) or the relative bid–ask spread (SPREAD), and the
other explanatory variables (outlined in Section 4.4). The estimated coefficients on both INSO and INSTO are positive in all twelve
specifications in Panels A and B. The coefficients on INSTO are statistically significant in allmodelswhile those of INSO are significant in
eight of the twelvemodels. Overall, we can conclude that an increase in the holdings of either class ofwell-informed investors reduces
the profits companies make from repurchasing at bargain prices.
The statistical significance of INSTO is far greater than that of INSO, which suggests that the results for the combined measure
(INSO+INSTO) reported in Table 7 are primarily driven by INSTO. The coefficients on AMIHUD and SPREAD are always positive and
statistically significant confirming our earlier conclusion: lower liquidity and higher transaction costs are associated with a reduction in
the timing of repurchases. The remaining explanatory variables have coefficients that are normally statistically insignificant, although the
coefficients on CASH and MV are significant in a few cases. Splitting the combined ownership measure (INSO+INSTO) into its two
components increases the explanatory power of all the regressions as indicated by the higher adjusted R-squared statistics.
Finally, in Table 9, we add as an explanatory variable the squared term of insider ownership (INSO2). The estimated coefficient on
the linear term of INSO reported in Table 9 is negative while the coefficient on squared insider ownership INSO2 is positive; and both
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. These results suggest a non-linear relation between insider ownership
and companies' profits from timing repurchases. At low levels of INSO, an increase in insider ownership raises the propensity of
company insiders to time OMRs (as shown by a decrease in the timing measures) given that the benefits from timing to non-selling
insiders are positively related to their shareholdings. This result suggests that the wealth transfer effect dominates the information
effect at low levels of insider ownership. At high levels of INSO, by contrast, higher insider ownership reduces the gains from timing
OMRs. Here, the wealth transfer effect is more than offset by the information effect of more informed shareholders increasing the
information contained in market valuations and reducing companies' profits from repurchasing stock at bargain prices. As a result,
there is an inverted U-shaped relation between insider ownership (on the x-axis) and the gains from timing repurchases (on the
y-axis). Across the twelve regressions reported in Table 9, the turning points for the variable INSO (i.e. values of INSO at which the
values of the dependent variables are minimized) range from 15.14% to 18.36%.
Table 6
Pair-wise correlations for the variables INSO, INSTO, INSO+INSTO, AMIHUD, SPREAD, SD, MV, CASH, CF, and MB.
INSO INSTO INSO+INSTO AMIHUD SPREAD SD MV CASH CF MB
INSO 1
INSTO −0.4824 1
(b0.0001)
INSO+INSTO −0.0405 0.8948 1
(0.5115) (b0.0001)
AMIHUD 0.1324 −0.2631 −0.2326 1
(0.0312) (b0.0001) (0.0001)
SPREAD 0.3444 −0.6049 −0.5144 0.6877 1
(b0.0001) (b0.0001) (b0.0001) (b0.0001)
SD 0.3165 −0.0201 0.1384 0.0209 0.1392 1
(b0.0001) (0.7441) (0.0243) (0.7355) (0.0234)
MV −0.291 0.4245 0.3359 −0.2417 −0.6215 −0.4006 1
(b0.0001) (b0.0001) (b0.0001) (0.0001) (b0.0001) (b0.0001)
CASH −0.0064 0.1867 0.2098 −0.0525 −0.1387 0.51 −0.0568 1
(0.9179) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.3943) (0.0239) (b0.0001) (0.3571)
CF −0.052 0.4306 0.4647 −0.1372 −0.3402 0.0124 0.2758 0.1914 1
(0.3993) (b0.0001) (b0.0001) (0.0256) (b0.0001) (0.8408) (b0.0001) (0.0017)
MB 0.0695 0.2223 0.2891 −0.1144 −0.262 0.2292 0.2491 0.4188 0.6981 1
(0.2592) (0.0003) (b0.0001) (0.0629) (b0.0001) (0.0002) (b0.0001) (b0.0001) (b0.0001)
The table contains pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables INSO, INSTO, INSO+INSTO, AMIHUD, SPREAD, SD,MV, CASH, CF, andMB for a sample with
265 companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. The companies are identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC
Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. For each repurchasing company, a 19-month sample period is identified. The first month in the sample period is that
following themonth in which the company announces a repurchase program. Data on insider ownership and on ownership by institutional investors are obtained from
proxy statements and from Thomson Financial respectively. Market data on stock prices, stock returns, trading volumes, ask and bid prices, and numbers of outstanding
shares are downloaded from CRSP. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat. For each company, INSO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all the
company's officers and directors on the last proxy statement date before the start of the 19-month sample period. INSTO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held
by all institutional investors (required to file Form 13F) on the end-of-quarter date before the initiation of the 19-month sample period that is nearest to the date of the
proxy statement that is used to collect INSO. INSO+INSTO is the sumof INSO and INSTO. AMIHUD is the average value of 1,000,000 times the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio
(absolute value of daily return over daily dollar volume) in the sample period. SPREAD is the average daily relative bid–ask spread (difference between ask and bid prices
over the average of the twoprices) in the sample period. SD is the standard deviation of thedaily return over the sample period.MV is thenatural logarithmof themarket
capitalization (stock pricemultiplied by the number of outstanding shares in thousands) on the last trading day before the start of the sample period. The variables CASH,
CF, andMB are computed usingmarket and accounting data for the last fiscal year that does not include parts of the sample period. CASH is the end-of-year value of cash
and short-term investments (Compustat item 1) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets (Compustat item 6). CF is the annual value of operating income before
depreciation and amortization (Compustat item 13) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets.MB is the sum of the values of market capitalization (inmillions) and
total liabilities (Compustat item 181), both at year end, scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. p-Values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7
Determinants of the timing of OMRs: shareholding of informed investors (INSO+INSTO), Amihud ratio (AMIHUD), and bid–ask spread (SPREAD).
Independent
variables
Dependent variable
A%PRICES A%PRICEW %COST1S %COST1W %COST2S %COST2W
Panel A: Amihud ratio (AMIHUD)
INSO+INSTO 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎ 0.0013⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(2.71) (2.57) (2.57) (3.13) (2.17) (2.92)
AMIHUD 0.0012⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎ 0.0039⁎⁎ 0.0046⁎⁎⁎ 0.0024⁎⁎ 0.0032⁎⁎
(2.34) (2.41) (2.19) (2.66) (2.02) (2.6)
SD 0.0177 0.3001 −0.9807 −1.5597 −2.3988 −3.2993
(0.04) (0.7) (−0.33) (−0.46) (−0.98) (−1.21)
MV 0.001 0.0014 0.0049 0.0097 −0.0008 0.0019
(1.17) (1.57) (1) (1.6) (−0.22) (0.43)
CASH −0.0214⁎ −0.0248⁎⁎ −0.082 −0.1002 −0.059 −0.0705
(−1.93) (−2.34) (−0.95) (−1.1) (−0.76) (−0.85)
CF −0.0267 −0.0167 −0.1337 −0.1272 −0.1008 −0.1166
(−1.17) (−0.78) (−0.97) (−0.9) (−0.93) (−1.04)
MB 0.0006 0.0005 0.0049 0.0063 0.0086 0.0107
(0.46) (0.4) (0.51) (0.58) (1.03) (1.18)
Constant −0.0163 −0.0211 −0.03 −0.1176 0.0022 −0.0575
(−0.73) (−0.88) (−0.23) (−0.77) (0.02) (−0.46)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.2091 0.2142 0.1294 0.1581 0.0825 0.1178
Panel B: bid–ask spread (SPREAD)
INSO+INSTO 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0013⁎⁎⁎ 0.0016⁎⁎⁎ 0.0009⁎⁎ 0.0012⁎⁎⁎
(3.66) (3.36) (2.88) (3.31) (2.38) (2.98)
SPREAD 1.4665⁎⁎⁎ 1.3543⁎⁎⁎ 4.8774⁎⁎ 4.7757⁎⁎ 3.3389⁎ 3.2828⁎
(4.01) (3.9) (2.47) (2.24) (1.92) (1.74)
SD −0.0194 0.2658 −1.1039 −1.6812 −2.4891 −3.4196
(−0.05) (0.68) (−0.39) (−0.52) (−1.07) (−1.29)
MV 0.0028⁎⁎⁎ 0.003⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎ 0.0155⁎⁎ 0.0028 0.0053
(2.79) (2.93) (1.75) (2.13) (0.61) (1.02)
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CASH −0.0164 −0.0202⁎⁎ −0.0652 −0.084 −0.0492 −0.0609
(−1.6) (−2.04) (−0.78) (−0.95) (−0.65) (−0.75)
CF −0.0221 −0.0125 −0.1186 −0.1122 −0.0922 −0.108
(−1.07) (−0.64) (−0.92) (−0.84) (−0.89) (−1.01)
MB 0.0004 0.0003 0.0045 0.0058 0.0082 0.0103
(0.38) (0.31) (0.47) (0.55) (1.01) (1.16)
Constant −0.0514⁎⁎ −0.0536⁎⁎ −0.1478 −0.2301 −0.0721 −0.1279
(−2.11) (−2.04) (−0.94) (−1.29) (−0.55) (−0.87)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.2703 0.2473 0.1496 0.1725 0.0932 0.1252
***: significant at 1%;**: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of six measures of a company's profits from timing OMRs on ownership, liquidity, and other explanatory variables. Two samples are used: one with 214 and one with 265
companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. The companies in the two samples are identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and
Acquisitions. For each repurchasing company, a 19-month sample period is identified. The first month in the sample period is that following the month in which the company announces a repurchase program. Data on the
repurchase activity of the companies in the samples are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Market data on stock prices, stock returns, trading volumes, ask and bid prices, and numbers of outstanding shares are
downloaded from CRSP. Data on insider ownership and on ownership by institutional investors are obtained from proxy statements and from Thomson Financial respectively. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat.
For each company, A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is calculated using months in which the company repurchases stock. For each of these months, %PRICES (%PRICEW) is the percent difference between the average repurchase price
and the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price of the company's stock. A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is the average value of %PRICES (%PRICEW) over the months in which repurchases are made. %COST1S (%COST1W)
is the percent difference between the effective total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock
is repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months. %COST2S (%COST2W) is the difference between the estimated total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the
company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock is repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months.
The monthly estimated total cost of repurchases used to compute %COST2S (%COST2W) is the number of repurchased shares times the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the month; monthly
estimated costs are cumulated to find the estimated total cost of repurchases over the 19-month period. INSO+INSTO is the sum of INSO and INSTO. INSO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all the
company's officers and directors on the last proxy statement date before the start of the 19-month sample period. INSTO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors (required to file Form
13F) on the end-of-quarter date before the initiation of the 19-month sample period that is nearest to the date of the proxy statement that is used to collect INSO. AMIHUD is the average value of 1,000,000 times the daily
Amihud illiquidity ratio (absolute value of daily return over daily dollar volume) in the sample period. SPREAD is the average daily relative bid–ask spread (difference between ask and bid prices over the average of the two
prices) in the sample period. SD is the standard deviation of the daily return over the sample period.MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares in
thousands) on the last trading day before the start of the sample period. The variables CASH, CF, and MB are computed using market and accounting data for the last fiscal year that does not include parts of the sample
period. CASH is the end-of-year value of cash and short-term investments (Compustat item 1) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets (Compustat item 6). CF is the annual value of operating income before
depreciation and amortization (Compustat item 13) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. MB is the sum of the values of market capitalization (in millions) and total liabilities (Compustat item 181), both at year
end, scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. A set of industry dummies is included among the explanatory variables. Estimates for these dummies are not reported. For each regression, the table reports estimates of
the constant, the number of observations, and the adjusted R-squared. t-Statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis.
1041
A
.D
e
Cesariet
al./
JournalofCorporate
Finance
18
(2012)
1023
–1050
Table 8
Determinants of the timing of OMRs: insider ownership (INSO), institutional ownership (INSTO), Amihud ratio (AMIHUD), and bid–ask spread (SPREAD).
Independent
variables
Dependent variable
A%PRICES A%PRICEW %COST1S %COST1W %COST2S %COST2W
Panel A: Amihud ratio (AMIHUD)
INSO 0.0003 0.0003 0.0025⁎⁎ 0.0026⁎⁎ 0.0016⁎ 0.0016⁎
(1.43) (1.65) (2.12) (2.03) (1.93) (1.79)
INSTO 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎ 0.0013⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(2.67) (2.57) (2.5) (3.1) (2.05) (2.85)
AMIHUD 0.0012⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎ 0.0032⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎ 0.0019⁎ 0.0028⁎⁎
(2.34) (2.42) (2.03) (2.51) (1.76) (2.542)
SD −0.0665 0.1795 −1.9813 −2.4322 −3.0161 −3.7597
(−0.17) (0.5) (−0.79) (−0.81) (−1.4) (−1.46)
MV 0.0012 0.0016⁎ 0.0066 0.0111⁎ 0.0001 0.0025
(1.22) (1.67) (1.26) (1.8) (0.04) (0.58)
CASH −0.0197⁎ −0.0223⁎⁎ −0.061 −0.0819 −0.0448 −0.0606
(−1.92) (−2.31) (−0.74) (−0.92) (−0.6) (−0.74)
CF −0.0258 −0.0153 −0.1226 −0.1176 −0.0909 −0.1097
(−1.17) (−0.77) (−0.96) (−0.89) (−0.89) (−1.04)
MB 0.0004 0.0002 0.0026 0.0043 0.0068 0.0095
(0.31) (0.17) (0.28) (0.41) (0.86) (1.1)
Constant −0.0168 −0.0218 −0.036 −0.1228 −0.00006 −0.0591
(−0.75) (−0.91) (−0.28) (−0.83) (−0.00) (−0.48)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.2137 0.2236 0.1483 0.17 0.0936 0.1222
Panel B: bid–ask spread (SPREAD)
INSO 0.0003 0.0003 0.0024⁎⁎ 0.0025⁎⁎ 0.0016⁎ 0.0016⁎
(1.39) (1.64) (2.11) (2.02) (1.93) (1.79)
INSTO 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0012⁎⁎⁎ 0.0015⁎⁎⁎ 0.0008⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎⁎
(3.67) (3.4) (2.8) (3.28) (2.25) (2.92)
SPREAD 1.4581⁎⁎⁎ 1.2958⁎⁎⁎ 3.995⁎⁎ 4.0302⁎⁎ 2.6642⁎ 2.8662⁎
(4.09) (4.05) (2.39) (2.13) (1.79) (1.66)
SD −0.0267 0.215 −1.8717 −2.3299 −2.9662 −3.7142
(−0.07) (0.61) (−0.75) (−0.77) (−1.39) (−1.45)
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MV 0.0028⁎⁎⁎ 0.0031⁎⁎⁎ 0.0112⁎ 0.0156⁎⁎ 0.0029 0.0054
(2.76) (2.94) (1.82) (2.17) (0.63) (1.03)
CASH −0.0163 −0.0193⁎⁎ −0.0518 −0.0726 −0.0398 −0.0551
(−1.65) (−2.05) (−0.64) (−0.83) (−0.54) (−0.68)
CF −0.0221 −0.0121 −0.1125 −0.107 −0.0859 −0.1041
(−1.08) (−0.64) (−0.91) (−0.84) (−0.86) (−1.01)
MB 0.0004 0.0002 0.0027 0.0043 0.0069 0.0095
(0.36) (0.21) (0.3) (0.42) (0.88) (1.12)
Constant −0.0512⁎⁎ −0.0524⁎⁎ −0.1305 −0.2155 −0.0586 −0.1196
(−2.17) (−2.07) (−0.9) (−1.27) (−0.47) (−0.83)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.2703 0.2679 0.1606 0.179 0.0999 0.1273
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of six measures of a company's profits from timing OMRs on ownership, liquidity, and other explanatory variables. Two samples are used: one with 214 and one with 265
companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. The companies in the two samples are identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and
Acquisitions. For each repurchasing company, a 19-month sample period is identified. The first month in the sample period is that following the month in which the company announces a repurchase program. Data on the
repurchase activity of the companies in the samples are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Market data on stock prices, stock returns, trading volumes, ask and bid prices, and numbers of outstanding shares are
downloaded from CRSP. Data on insider ownership and on ownership by institutional investors are obtained from proxy statements and from Thomson Financial respectively. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat.
For each company, A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is calculated using months in which the company repurchases stock. For each of these months, %PRICES (%PRICEW) is the percent difference between the average repurchase price
and the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price of the company's stock. A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is the average value of %PRICES (%PRICEW) over the months in which repurchases are made. %COST1S (%COST1W)
is the percent difference between the effective total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock
is repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months. %COST2S (%COST2W) is the difference between the estimated total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the
company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock is repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months.
The monthly estimated total cost of repurchases used to compute %COST2S (%COST2W) is the number of repurchased shares times the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the month; monthly
estimated costs are cumulated to find the estimated total cost of repurchases over the 19-month period. INSO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all the company's officers and directors on the last proxy
statement date before the start of the 19-month sample period. INSTO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors (required to file Form 13F) on the end-of-quarter date before the initiation
of the 19-month sample period that is nearest to the date of the proxy statement that is used to collect INSO. AMIHUD is the average value of 1,000,000 times the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio (absolute value of daily return
over daily dollar volume) in the sample period. SPREAD is the average daily relative bid–ask spread (difference between ask and bid prices over the average of the two prices) in the sample period. SD is the standard
deviation of the daily return over the sample period. MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares in thousands) on the last trading day before the
start of the sample period. The variables CASH, CF, andMB are computed using market and accounting data for the last fiscal year that does not include parts of the sample period. CASH is the end-of-year value of cash and
short-term investments (Compustat item 1) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets (Compustat item 6). CF is the annual value of operating income before depreciation and amortization (Compustat item 13) scaled
by the end-of-year value of total assets. MB is the sum of the values of market capitalization (in millions) and total liabilities (Compustat item 181), both at year end, scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. A set of
industry dummies is included among the explanatory variables. Estimates for these dummies are not reported. For each regression, the table reports estimates of the constant, the number of observations, and the adjusted R-
squared. t-Statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 9
Determinants of the timing of OMRs: insider ownership (INSO), squared insider ownership (INSO2), institutional ownership (INSTO), Amihud ratio (AMIHUD), and bid–ask spread (SPREAD).
Independent
variables
Dependent variable
A%PRICES A%PRICEW %COST1S %COST1W %COST2S %COST2W
Panel A: Amihud ratio (AMIHUD)
INSO −0.0006⁎⁎ −0.0006⁎ −0.0044⁎⁎⁎ −0.0045⁎⁎ −0.0039⁎⁎ −0.0039⁎⁎
(−2.25) (−1.97) (−2.73) (−2.39) (−2.56) (−2.23)
INSO2 0.00002⁎⁎⁎ 0.00002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎
(3.29) (3.18) (4.44) (3.72) (3.42) (2.92)
INSTO 0.0002⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎ 0.0009⁎⁎ 0.0012⁎⁎⁎ 0.0006⁎ 0.0009⁎⁎⁎
(2.54) (2.41) (2.37) (2.98) (1.84) (2.67)
AMIHUD 0.0012⁎⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎⁎ 0.0035⁎⁎⁎ 0.0043⁎⁎⁎ 0.0024⁎⁎ 0.0033⁎⁎⁎
(2.82) (3.01) (2.9) (3.39) (2.45) (3.07)
SD −0.3265 −0.0761 −3.9343⁎ −4.4303 −4.2265⁎⁎ −4.9654⁎⁎
(−1) (−0.27) (−1.8) (−1.61) (−2.3) (−2.17)
MV 0.0002 0.0006 −0.0008 0.0035 −0.0049 −0.0024
(0.21) (0.7) (−0.17) (0.58) (−1.36) (−0.58)
CASH −0.0148 −0.0175⁎ −0.0242 −0.0443 −0.0203 −0.0362
(−1.45) (−1.82) (−0.3) (−0.5) (−0.28) (−0.45)
CF −0.0163 −0.006 −0.0514 −0.0448 −0.0647 −0.0836
(−0.89) (−0.37) (−0.5) (−0.43) (−0.74) (−0.93)
MB 0.0005 0.0003 0.0034 0.005 0.0075 0.0102
(0.4) (0.26) (0.36) (0.47) (0.97) (1.19)
Constant 0.005 −0.0004 0.1276 0.0445 0.1174 0.0579
(0.26) (−0.02) (1.05) (0.3) (1.17) (0.49)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.2702 0.2774 0.2397 0.2491 0.1647 0.1798
Panel B: bid–ask spread (SPREAD)
INSO −0.0005⁎ −0.0005⁎ −0.0042⁎⁎ −0.0043⁎⁎ −0.0038⁎⁎ −0.0038⁎⁎
(−1.95) (−1.72) (−2.6) (−2.26) (−2.51) (−2.17)
INSO2
INSTO
0.00002⁎⁎⁎ 0.00002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001⁎⁎⁎
(2.87) (2.8) (4.22) (3.5) (3.38) (2.86)
0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.0002⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎ 0.0013⁎⁎⁎ 0.0007⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(3.5) (3.19) (2.55) (3.04) (1.99) (2.7)
SPREAD 1.3278⁎⁎⁎ 1.1657⁎⁎⁎ 2.9168⁎⁎ 2.9269⁎ 2.0234 2.2303
(4.4) (4.33) (2.07) (1.66) (1.58) (1.41)
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SD −0.259 −0.0169 −3.7938⁎ −4.2964 −4.1693⁎⁎ −4.908⁎⁎
(−0.8) (−0.06) (−1.73) (−1.55) (−2.27) (−2.13)
MV 0.0018⁎ 0.002⁎⁎ 0.0026 0.0068 −0.0028 −0.0003
(1.96) (2.15) (0.46) (0.98) (−0.69) (−0.06)
CASH −0.0123 −0.0153 −0.0187 −0.0387 −0.017 −0.0325
(−1.24) (−1.62) (−0.23) (−0.44) (−0.23) (−0.41)
CF −0.0141 −0.0041 −0.0461 −0.0391 −0.0613 −0.0796
(−0.81) (−0.26) (−0.45) (−0.38) (−0.71) (−0.9)
MB 0.0005 0.0003 0.0034 0.005 0.0075 0.0102
(0.44) (0.29) (0.36) (0.47) (0.98) (1.2)
Constant −0.0286 −0.0299 0.0566 −0.024 0.0731 0.0111
(−1.41) (−1.36) (0.42) (−0.15) (0.66) (0.08)
Observations 214 214 214 214 265 265
Adjusted R-squared 0.3129 0.3096 0.2441 0.2513 0.1672 0.1814
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of six measures of a company's profits from timing OMRs on ownership, liquidity, and other explanatory variables. Two samples are used: one with 214 and one with 265
companies that announced repurchase programs in 2004. The companies in the two samples are identified through a search of announcements of repurchase programs on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and
Acquisitions. For each repurchasing company, a 19-month sample period is identified. The first month in the sample period is that following the month in which the company announces a repurchase program. Data on the
repurchase activity of the companies in the samples are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. Market data on stock prices, stock returns, trading volumes, ask and bid prices, and numbers of outstanding shares are
downloaded from CRSP. Data on insider ownership and on ownership by institutional investors are obtained from proxy statements and from Thomson Financial respectively. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat.
For each company, A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is calculated using months in which the company repurchases stock. For each of these months, %PRICES (%PRICEW) is the percent difference between the average repurchase price
and the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price of the company's stock. A%PRICES (A%PRICEW) is the average value of %PRICES (%PRICEW) over the months in which repurchases are made. %COST1S (%COST1W)
is the percent difference between the effective total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock is
repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months. %COST2S (%COST2W) is the difference between the estimated total cost of repurchases in the 19 months following the
company's repurchase announcement and a benchmark total cost of repurchases based on the assumption that stock is repurchased at the stock's simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the 19 months.
The monthly estimated total cost of repurchases used to compute %COST2S (%COST2W) is the number of repurchased shares times the simple (volume-weighted) average daily closing price over the month; monthly
estimated costs are cumulated to find the estimated total cost of repurchases over the 19-month period. INSO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all the company's officers and directors on the last proxy
statement date before the start of the 19-month sample period. INSTO is the percentage of the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors (required to file Form 13F) on the end-of-quarter date before the initiation
of the 19-month sample period that is nearest to the date of the proxy statement that is used to collect INSO. AMIHUD is the average value of 1,000,000 times the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio (absolute value of daily return
over daily dollar volume) in the sample period. SPREAD is the average daily relative bid–ask spread (difference between ask and bid prices over the average of the two prices) in the sample period. SD is the standard
deviation of the daily return over the sample period.MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares in thousands) on the last trading day before the start
of the sample period. The variables CASH, CF, andMB are computed using market and accounting data for the last fiscal year that does not include parts of the sample period. CASH is the end-of-year value of cash and short-
term investments (Compustat item 1) scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets (Compustat item 6). CF is the annual value of operating income before depreciation and amortization (Compustat item 13) scaled by the
end-of-year value of total assets.MB is the sum of the values of market capitalization (in millions) and total liabilities (Compustat item 181), both at year end, scaled by the end-of-year value of total assets. A set of industry
dummies is included among the explanatory variables. Estimates for these dummies are not reported. For each regression, the table reports estimates of the constant, the number of observations, and the adjusted R-squared.
t-Statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis.
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As in the previous two tables, in Table 9 the coefficients on INSTO, AMIHUD, and SPREAD are positive and significant at standard
levels in all or most specifications (the exceptions are the insignificant coefficients on SPREAD in two regressions). Further,
the coefficients on the remaining explanatory variables are normally not statistically different from zero. Based on the higher
adjusted R-squared values in Table 9, as compared to Tables 7 and 8, we conclude that the set of explanatory variables that
explains most of the variation in the timing measures comprises both a linear and a squared term for insider ownership (INSO and
INSO2), a linear term for institutional ownership (INSTO), and one of the two measures of liquidity and transaction costs (AMIHUD
or SPREAD).
Based on the estimates of Tables 7 to 9, we can draw the following three conclusions. First, an increase in the presence of well-
informed shareholders is associated with a decrease in companies' profits from repurchasing stock at comparatively low prices.
This finding is mainly driven by the shareholdings of institutional investors. Second, when insider ownership is low, an increase in
this variable boosts companies' propensity to time repurchases. In contrast, when insider ownership is high, there is a negative
relation between this variable and repurchase timing. This suggests that the companies achieving the highest profits from
timing repurchases are those with intermediate levels of insider ownership. Finally, higher stock liquidity and lower transaction
costs increase the gains from repurchase timing in terms of the cost savings companies can make by repurchasing stock at
comparatively low prices.
4.7. Endogeneity of liquidity measures
There is some previous evidence showing that stock repurchases can affect the liquidity of a stock (e.g., Brockman and Chung, 2001;
Cook et al., 2004) and that repurchase decisions may be driven by liquidity considerations (Brockman et al., 2008). Although the
dependent variables we use in Tables 7, 8, and 9measure repurchase timing (in terms of price advantages and cost savings) and not the
magnitude of repurchase activities as inmost previous studies, we cannot ex ante rule out the possibility that our liquiditymeasures are
endogenous in the regressions. We formally test the endogeneity of AMIHUD and SPREAD using a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimator with robust standard errors and two endogeneity tests (Wooldridge's robust score and robust regression tests). For each
company,we use the average value of the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio (relative bid–ask spread) in the sixmonths before the start of the
sample period as an instrument for the variableAMIHUD (SPREAD).We replicate the regressions of Table 9 and find that inmost cases the
null hypothesis that the liquidity measure (AMIHUD or SPREAD) is exogenous is not rejected.30 The coefficients on all the independent
variables are qualitatively similar to those obtained in theOLS regressions but those onAMIHUD and SPREAD are statistically significant in
only three specifications. The loss of significance when using a 2SLS estimator is expected. As documented in the econometric literature,
2SLS estimates may be significantly biased in small samples, and 2SLS standard errors are likely to be comparatively larger than OLS
standard errors (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, Section 5.2.6). Given the problems of applying the 2SLS estimator to our sample, and
considering that AMIHUD and SPREAD are normally exogenous in our specifications, we conclude that the OLS results reported in
Table 9 are reliable.
5. Conclusion
We investigate the timing of open market repurchase (OMR) transactions using a novel dataset collected from SEC filings that
have become available since 2004.
We present evidence that companies time repurchases and buy back stock at comparatively low prices. We show that companies
tend to repurchase shares in months when the share price dips. We also show that there are negative abnormal returns in periods
preceding months with repurchase activity and positive abnormal returns in periods following months with repurchase activity.
Finally, we quantify the price advantages and cost savings companies make when repurchasing stock. The majority of trading gains
come from repurchasing stock inmonthswhen prices are relatively low. The cost savings companies make by timing repurchases are
economically significant. The average 19-month cost savings are about 0.25% of the market capitalization of a company and about
0.54% of the book value of total assets. For some companies the cost savings are very large; maximum savings are 7.76% of a market
capitalization and 28.21% of total assets.
We present evidence that companies' profits from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Specifically,
institutional ownership reduces the gains from timing OMRs. This relation is consistent with the information effect that predicts that
larger shareholdings by informed (institutional) investors increase the information contained in market valuations and reduce
companies' opportunities to profit from repurchasing stock at bargain prices.
The impact of insider ownership on timing profits is nonlinear. Specifically, there is an inverted u-shaped relation between
insider ownership (on the x-axis) and the gains from timing repurchases (on the y-axis). This suggests that at low levels of insider
ownership the wealth transfer effect dominates the information effect. The wealth transfer effect predicts a positive impact of
insider ownership on repurchase timing because the benefits to non-selling insiders from timing repurchases are directly related
to their shareholdings. At high levels of insider ownership, by contrast, a further increase in insider ownership reduces the gains from
30 The adjusted R-squares of the ﬁrst stage regressions range from 0.4708 to 0.8187, indicating that the instruments used are not weak. Also, the coefﬁcients on
the lagged liquidity measures are always statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage regressions. The p-value of at least one of the two endogeneity tests we conduct
is lower than 10%, rejecting exogeneity, in only two of the twelve regressions we estimate.
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timing. Here, the wealth transfer effect is more than offset by the information effect of higher informed ownership that reduces a
company's opportunities to buy back undervalued stock.
We also document a significant positive impact of stock liquidity on companies' profits from timing OMRs. This is consistent
with our prediction that companies with illiquid stocks have fewer opportunities to time OMRs because of high transaction costs
and the large price impact of transactions in illiquid markets.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Distribution of the number of firm-months by calendar month.
The table presents the distributions of the number of firm-months by calendarmonth over the period February 2004–July 2006
for a sample of 5035 firm-months, a sub-sample of 2939 firm-months with open market share repurchases, and a sub-sample of
2096 firm-months without open market share repurchases. The 5035 observations in the sample are for 265 repurchasing
companies (19 firm-months per company) that announced open market repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are
Calendar month All ﬁrm-months Firm-months with repurchases Firm-months without repurchases
Frequency % Frequency Frequency % Frequency Frequency % Frequency
February 2004 10 0.2 9 0.31 1 0.05
March 2004 37 0.73 26 0.88 11 0.52
April 2004 51 1.01 32 1.09 19 0.91
May 2004 66 1.31 55 1.87 11 0.52
June 2004 93 1.85 62 2.11 31 1.48
July 2004 114 2.26 70 2.38 44 2.1
August 2004 146 2.9 107 3.64 39 1.86
September 2004 182 3.61 101 3.44 81 3.86
October 2004 204 4.05 105 3.57 99 4.72
November 2004 220 4.37 119 4.05 101 4.82
December 2004 241 4.79 122 4.15 119 5.68
January 2005 265 5.26 132 4.49 133 6.35
February 2005 265 5.26 153 5.21 112 5.34
March 2005 265 5.26 170 5.78 95 4.53
April 2005 265 5.26 154 5.24 111 5.3
May 2005 265 5.26 180 6.12 85 4.06
June 2005 265 5.26 146 4.97 119 5.68
July 2005 265 5.26 126 4.29 139 6.63
August 2005 265 5.26 183 6.23 82 3.91
September 2005 255 5.06 153 5.21 102 4.87
October 2005 228 4.53 125 4.25 103 4.91
November 2005 214 4.25 129 4.39 85 4.06
December 2005 199 3.95 114 3.88 85 4.06
January 2006 172 3.42 69 2.35 103 4.91
February 2006 151 3 92 3.13 59 2.81
March 2006 119 2.36 69 2.35 50 2.39
April 2006 83 1.65 39 1.33 44 2.1
May 2006 61 1.21 45 1.53 16 0.76
June 2006 45 0.89 36 1.22 9 0.43
July 2006 24 0.48 16 0.54 8 0.38
Total 5035 100 2939 100 2096 100
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identified through a search on SDC Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these
companies are collected fromSEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings. For each sample of firm-months and each calendarmonth, the table reports
the number of firm-months (Frequency) and the number of firm-months multiplied by 100 and divided by the total number of firm-
months in the sample (% Frequency).
Table A2. Distribution of the number of firm-months by event month.
The table presents the distributions of the number of firm-months by event month for a sample of 5035 firm-months, a
sub-sample of 2939 firm-months with open market share repurchases, and a sub-sample of 2096 firm-months without open
market share repurchases. The 5035 observations in the sample are for 265 repurchasing companies (19 firm-months per
company) that announced open market repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are identified through a search on SDC
PlatinumDatabase of Mergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and
10-Qs filings. Eventmonth+1 is themonth that follows themonth of the announcement of an openmarket repurchase programby a
company (eventmonth 0). Eventmonth+19 is the 19thmonth after eventmonth 0. For each sample of firm-months and each event
month, the table reports the number of firm-months (Frequency) and the number of firm-months multiplied by 100 and divided by
the total number of firm-months in the sample (% Frequency).
Event
month
All ﬁrm-months Firm-months with repurchases Firm-months without repurchases
Frequency % Frequency Frequency % Frequency Frequency % Frequency
+1 265 5.26 179 6.09 86 4.1
+2 265 5.26 154 5.24 111 5.3
+3 265 5.26 161 5.48 104 4.96
+4 265 5.26 154 5.24 111 5.3
+5 265 5.26 143 4.87 122 5.82
+6 265 5.26 150 5.1 115 5.49
+7 265 5.26 158 5.38 107 5.1
+8 265 5.26 150 5.1 115 5.49
+9 265 5.26 153 5.21 112 5.34
+10 265 5.26 163 5.55 102 4.87
+11 265 5.26 156 5.31 109 5.2
+12 265 5.26 153 5.21 112 5.34
+13 265 5.26 156 5.31 109 5.2
+14 265 5.26 159 5.41 106 5.06
+15 265 5.26 158 5.38 107 5.1
+16 265 5.26 158 5.38 107 5.1
+17 265 5.26 136 4.63 129 6.15
+18 265 5.26 147 5 118 5.63
+19 265 5.26 151 5.14 114 5.44
Total 5035 100 2939 100 2096 100
Fig. A1. The graph shows the average value of the variable REP for each event month. REP is equal to the number of shares
repurchased by a company in a month over the company's number of outstanding shares at the start of the month. The average
values of REP are computed using 5035 ﬁrm-month observations for 265 repurchasing companies (19 ﬁrm-months per company)
that announced open market repurchase programs in 2004. These companies are identiﬁed through a search on SDC Platinum
Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. Data on the repurchase activity of these companies are collected from SEC 10-Ks and 10-Qs
ﬁlings. Event month +1 is the month that follows the month of the announcement of an open market repurchase program by a
company (event month 0). Event month +19 is the 19th month after event month 0. Event month numbers are reported on the
horizontal axis.
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Appendix 2
The numerical examples presented below illustrate the calculation of the “between-month” and the “within-month” cost
savings, our so called “timing measures”.
In the first example, we assume that the price of a stock always equals 10 except on day X in month Y when it is 7. Assuming
that the company repurchases only one share on day X, we compute the total cost savings from timing by comparing the average
repurchase price (7) with the average daily price over the 19-month sample period (approximately 9.99 assuming each month
has 21 trading days). In relative terms, the total cost savings are −0.3=((7–9.99)/9.99). To compute the trading gains from
“between-month” timing only, we assume that the share is bought back at the average price inmonth Y (9.86). The relative “between-
month” savings are−0.01=((9.86−9.99)/9.99). In this example, the stock price is significantly lower than its average value for a very
short period, i.e. only on day X. As a result, cost savings from “between-month” timing (−0.01) are far smaller than those from “within-
month” timing (−0.3+0.01=−0.029).
In the second example, we assume that the stock price is equal to 7 on day X and equal to 8 on all the other days in month Y; in all
othermonths it remains 10. Again assuming the companypurchases one share ondayX, the overall cost savings are−0.29=((7–9.89)/
9.89)where 9.89 is the average daily price over the 19-month period. “Between-month” savings are−0.2=((7.95−9.89)/9.89)where
7.95 is the average daily price over month Y. Contrary to the previous example, most of the cost savings arise from “between-month”
timing because the price of the stock is significantly below its average not only ondayXbut also on the other days inmonth Y.Hence, it is
possible to repurchase at comparatively low prices on any of the days in month Y.
The finding in our paper that “between-month” savings are larger than “within-month” savings is not driven by the construction
of our savings measures. “Between-month” savings are generally larger than “within-month” savings when stock prices are below
average prices for comparatively long periods.
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